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PROBLEMS WITH PURP A: THE NEED FOR 
STATE LEGISLATION TO ENCOURAGE 
COGENERATION AND SMALL POWER PRODUCTION 
Stanley A. Martin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, electric utilities in the United States used 5.3 trillion 
kilowatt-hours (KWH)1 of energy derived from fossil fuels. 2 This 
represented an increase of 22.5 percent over the previous five 
years.3 Even assuming a declining rate of increase, energy consump-
tion by electric utilities could exceed 8.4 trillion KWH by the year 
2000.4 The electric energy produced by the utilities pales in com-
parison to the total energy consumed, as the overall fuel efficiency 
average5 of the United States utility network is 29 percent.6 Out of 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. One kilowatt-hour equals 1000 watts produced for one hour. A kilowatt-hour (KwH) is 
equivalent to 3,409.52 British Thermal Units (BTU's), or 859,362 calories. Burning a 100-watt 
lightbulb for 10 hours would be equal to 1000 watt-hours, or 1 KwH. R. WEAST, HANDBOOK OF 
CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS F-286 (54th ed. 1873). 
2. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY. Pub. No. 
DOE/EIA-0191(80), COST AND QUALITY OF FUELS FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY PLANTS 1980 ANNUAL 
6 (1980). Fossil fuels are "[a]ny natural occurring fuel of an organic nature, such as coal, oil 
shale, natural gas, or crude oil." SOIL CONSERVATION SOCIETY OF AMERICA. RESOURCE CONSER-
VATION GLOSSARY 65 (3d ed. 1982). 
3. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 1979 47 
(1980). 
4. See Uhler and Zycher, Energy Forecasting and Its Uncertainties, 105 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 
27,28-30, January 17, 1980. Estimates of electric energy consumption for the year 2000 range 
from 8.4 trillion KwH to approximately 17.7 trillion KwH. I d. 
5. "Fuel efficiency" for the utility industry is the ratio of the value of usable energy pro-
duced in the form of electricity to the value of energy consumed by the utility in the form of 
raw fuels. RESEARCH PLANNING ASSOCIATES. THE POTENTIAL FOR INDUSTRIAL COGENERATION 
DEVELOPMENT BY 1990 iii (1981) [hereinafter cited as RPA COGENERATION REPORT]. 
6. Casten and Ross, Cogeneration and its Regulation, 107 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 18, Mar. 26, 
1981. 
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the 5.3 trillion KWH of energy consumed by the utilities in 1980, on-
ly 2.5 trillion KWH were generated for use by the consumer. 7 
It is against this background that measures to encourage greater 
fuel efficiency and a decreased dependence on fossil fuels will be 
discussed. The potential advantages of two measures - increased in-
dustrial "cogeneration" and generation of electricity using 
renewable resources - are very great. Cogeneration is the use of 
waste heat from an industrial process for the production of electrici-
ty, or the recapture of waste heat from electricity generation for use 
in an industrial process.8 Renewable resources such as solar, wind, 
or hydropower energy can also be used to generate electricity. 
Generators using these resources, often called "small power pro-
ducers", consume little or no fossil-fuel-generated electricity while 
generating electricity from a renewable fuel. 9 
The development of cogenerators and small power producers has 
been contingent upon the development of a market for the electricity 
produced by such facilities. The sale of electricity to the public, which 
ordinarily occurs through privately and publicly owned utilities,10 is 
heavily regulated by federal and state agencies.ll Thus, in order to 
7. The remaining 2.8 trillion KwH were used in the process of converting raw fuels to elec-
tricity, or were given off as waste heat, and not recovered. 
8. For a discussion of cogeneration principles and methods see Williams, Industrial 
Cogeneration, 3 ANN. REV. ENERGY 313 (1978). One writer has estimated that with extensive 
use of cogeneration techniques, energy efficiencies of up to 80% are attainable. Caston, supra 
note 6, at 18. The 80% figure includes other forms of energy, such as thermal energy, being 
produced concurrently with electrical energy. This does not represent a jump from 29% to 
80% efficiency in the production of electrical energy alone, but rather is the percentage of 
total energy consumed that is usable in some form. 
9. "Qualifying small power production facility" is defined in the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) according to fuel use, fuel efficiency, capacity, and ownership 
criteria. PURPA § 1(17)(c), 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(c) (Supp. V 1981). "Small power producer" is 
also a generic term within the utility industry, generally denoting a small power production 
facility that uses renewable resources for fuel. 
Renewable resources include solar, wind, biothermal and geothermal energy, and power pro-
duced by hydroelectric facilities. Biothermal energy is produced by burning trash, refuse, or 
other waste products. Geothermal energy is produced by tapping the earth's natural heat that 
exists several miles underground. Small power producers may need to use a small amount of 
externally-produced power to start up, monitor, test, or control generators fueled by 
renewable resources. 
10. In most states, all electric power sales occur through a privately-held utility or a 
publicly-held (or municipal) utility. The state mayor may not choose to regulate a publicly-held 
utility, but all other utilities would be regulated. See generally P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, 
PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 261 (1964) [hereinafter cited as P. GARFIELD]. 
11. State and federal agencies regulate sales of electricity by setting the rates at which the 
electricity is to be sold. State agencies are also involved with the enforcement of standards of 
service. Garfield, supra note 10, at 32. A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND INSTITUTIONS 20 (1970). See infra text and notes at notes 299-327. 
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avoid the economic burdens of regulation,12 cogenerators and small 
power producers must look to the utilities rather than the public as 
an outlet for their power. Electric utilities that are under a burden of 
state and/or federal regulation, however, do not always want to pur-
chase power from an unregulated entity such as a small power pro-
ducer.13 Utilities may view small power producers as competitors, 
each vying for the right to meet increasing power needs. As a result, 
electric utilities, which are the only reasonable outlet for the small 
power producers' power, have been reluctant to purchase such 
power at equitable rates.14 
Recognizing the need to encourage cogenerators and small power 
producers by ensuring a market for their power, Congress passed 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURP A).15 
PURP A includes provisions which require utilities to purchase 
power from cogenerators and small power producers.16 These provi-
sions have created conflicts between federal and state utility 
regulators,17 as the provisions represent an encroachment by the 
federal government upon traditional state regulatory controls. IS In 
the face of those conflicts, electric utilities challenged the power of 
the federal government to require utilities to purchase power from 
small power producers and cogenerators. Such challenges disrupted 
the implementation of provisions that encourage power production 
12. See infra note 76. 
13. Concern over possible discrimination by utilities against small power producers, with 
regard to buying power from and selling power to such producers, was a major factor in enact-
ing Title II of PURP A. See, e.g., 123 CONGo REC. 32,437 (1977). 
14. The argument over the rates that a utility must pay to a small power producer for elec-
tricity has engendered much of the litigation surrounding PURP A. The established rate-
setting standard promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was 
one of the major issues in American Electric Power v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1226, rev'd, (D.C. Cir. 
1982) 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983). See infra text at notes 244-92. 
15. Pub. L. No. 95-617 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 796-825r (1976 & Supp. V 1981». For the 
legislative history of PURPA, see S. REP. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); JOINT Ex· 
PLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797 [hereinafter cited as CON-
FERENCE REPORT]. 
16. PURPA § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
17. Within two years of enactment, the constitutionality of PURP A was challenged in State 
of Mississippi v. FERC, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). The petitioners challenged the imposition of 
federal standards upon state agencies. The Mississippi case is discussed in the text at notes 
205-43 infra. 
18. From the 1930's through the present, states have traditionally been the primary 
regulators of the utility industry, and federal restraints have generally been considered as sup-
plementary forms of regulation. S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoy, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE 
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 91 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. BREYER]. 
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using cogeneration or renewable resources. 19 As a result, achieve-
ment of the goal of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
(PURP A) - encouragement of cogeneration and small power pro-
duction - has been stymied. 
In an attempt to maintain support for the development of small 
power production, a small minority of states have enacted their own 
legislation similar to PURP A. 20 There have been no successful 
challenges to such state legislation. Furthermore, state-ordered pro-
grams do not involve the issues of preemption and federalism which 
may arise when federal legislation is directed toward state 
agencies.21 Given the problems of implementation of federal pro-
grams for utility regulation, state legislation may be necessary in 
order to encourage greater efficiency in electric power production 
and continued development of generators that use renewable re-
sources. The states may be able to exert more effective control over 
their regulatory agencies, and may thus be the most practical forum 
in which to promote policies for developing cogeneration and small 
power production. 
This article will focus on recent federal and state legislation de-
signed to encourage electric utilities to cooperate in reducing fossil 
fuel dependency, and the problems that have arisen in procuring the 
utilities' compliance. First, the interrelationship of federal and state 
regulation of utilities prior to the passage of PURP A will be ex-
amined in order to provide a context for evaluating PURP A. A dis-
cussion of PURPA's provisions will follow, focusing on the goals and 
policies stated by Congress and the specific measures designed to 
achieve those goals. Third, the regulatory structure controlling elec-
tric utilities will be analyzed in light of the federal/state tensions and 
conflicts over utility regulation. The resulting ability of utilities to 
avoid complying with the PURP A provisions which promote the 
development of cogenerators and small power producers will be dis-
cussed. Then, the article will examine legislative action that has been 
taken by a number of states in this area to demonstrate how some 
states have provided incentives for cogeneration and small power 
production, and how they have given additional support to the state 
public utility commissions for implementing those incentives. Final-
ly, state legislative proposals will be analyzed in terms of their ability 
to remove existing ambiguities in state regulatory authority or to 
19. See infra text at notes 205·43. 
20. See infra text and notes at notes 364·89. 
21. For discussion of preemption and the Mississippi case, see infra text at notes 205·43. 
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provide incentives to electric utilities to cooperate in reducing fossil 
fuel dependence and increasing the efficiency of electric energy 
generation. 
II. UTILITY REGULATION BEFORE PURP A 
From the time of the emergence of power utility companies in the 
1800's through the early 1900's, utility regulation occurred only at 
the state and locallevels.22 Utility regulation then, as now, involved 
a few basic characteristics. An electric utility is allowed to monop-
olize service over a particular area, and in return must submit to 
regulation by the government.23 State regulation of a utility general-
ly involves establishing standards of service,24 setting the rates that 
a utility will charge for power, 26 and establishing and monitoring the 
amount of return that utility owners will be allowed on their invest-
ment.26 In carrying out these tasks, state public utility commissions 
have necessarily maintained a large amount of contact with each 
utility under their jurisdiction while monitoring the utilities' 
activity. 27 
The first assertion of federal control over utility regulation came in 
1920, with the passage of the Federal Water Power Act (FWPA).28 
The Federal Water Power Act established the Federal Power Com-
mission (FPC),29 which was entrusted primarily with regulating 
federal hydropower projects.30 At the time of the FWP A, federal 
regulatory jurisdiction did not extend to the regulation of electric 
utilities.31 The first major change in this policy came with the 
Supreme Court decision in Public Utilities Commission v. 
22. S. BREYER, supra note 18, at 91. 
23. Utilities often need to make very heavy capital investments in order to provide the par-
ticular services. Due to these extensive capital requirements, such a "natural monopoly" is a 
much more economically efficient way of providing the service than is allowing several utilities 
to compete within the same area. P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 16-26. See generally A. KAHN, 
supra note 11, at 11-12. 
24. D. ZILLMAN & L. LA'ITMAN, ENERGY LAW 135-36 (1982). 
25. [d. 
26. [d. 
27. The development of a regulatory system based upon local supervision of utility actions 
has resulted in large variations from one state to another in utility regulation. For a brief ex-
position of the nature and amount of regular contact between public utility commission and 
utility, see D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES 62-68 (1981). 
28. Chapter 285,41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825 (1982». 
29. Chapter 285 § 1, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (repealed). 
30. See id. The FWP A granted federal jurisdiction only over hydropower projects. 
31. See id. 
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Attleboro.52 In that case, a Rhode Island electric utility had con-
tracted with the town of Attleboro, Massachusetts, to deliver 
electricity. The utility subsequently requested and received a rate in-
crease from the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission.55 The 
Town of Attleboro objected, and appealed the decision to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court. 54 The Rhode Island court reversed the Com-
mission, overruling the rate increase,55 and the Commission ap-
pealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.56 The Supreme Court upheld the 
Rhode Island court, finding that the rate increase amounted to a 
direct burden on interstate commerce.5.7 Furthermore, the Court 
stated that the rate was "not subject to regulation by either of the 
two States ... ; but, if such regulation is required it can only be at-
tained by the exercise of the power vested in Congress."5S 
At the time of the Attleboro decision, the Federal Water Power 
Act did not include the regulation of interstate electric rates. 59 Thus, 
the Supreme Court ruling that a state agency could not regulate in-
terstate electric rates resulted in the so-called "Attleboro gap", until 
Congress responded by amending the FWP A and giving to the FPC 
the power to regulate electric utility companies engaged in interstate 
commerce.40 The Federal Power Act of 1935 (FP A), 41 which 
32. 273 u.s. 83 (1927). 
33. Id. at 85-86. The utility had approached the Rhode Island Commission with a new 
schedule of rates. Due to certain requirements of the new schedule, Attleboro was the only 
customer to which the schedule would apply. Id. at 85 n.2. 
34. Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro, 46 R.I. 496 (1925). 
35.Id. 
36. 269 U.S. 546 (1925). 
37. 273 U.S. at 90. In ruling on the Rhode Island commission's ability to regulate the rates 
in question, the Court stated "the test of the validity of a state regulation is not the character 
of the general business of the company, but whether the particular business which is regulated 
is essentially local or national in character." Id. 
38. Id. The Court held that the state commission could not regulate the rates for electricity 
sold across the state line as "the paramount interest in the interstate business carried on be-
tween [the utility and Attleboro] ... is essentially national in character." Id. 
39. The original Federal Water Power Act consisted primarily of provisions relating to 
regulation of water power and development of water resources. Title II of the Public Utility 
Act of 1935 (often referred to as the Federal Power Act of 1935), ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.), amended the FWPA. The original Act became sub-
chapter I of the amended version, subsequently called the Federal Power Act. 
40. The Federal Power Act of 1935 gave the FPC the power to regulate electric utility com-
panies engaged in interstate commerce, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This section 
was later held to include regulation of wholesale electric rates, Federal Power Commission v. 
Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964), even when such rates were intrastate. 
Arkansas Power and Light Company v. Federal Power Commission, 368 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 
1966). 
41. See supra note 39. 
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amended the FWP A, left to the states those powers not specifically 
set forth in the Act.42 The Federal Power Act was amended on 
several occasions between 1935 and 1978, when PURP A was en-
acted. Before PURP A, the FP A was aimed only at granting author-
ity or issuing directives to a federal agency. 43 Only upon passage of 
PURP A did the FP A impose federal directives upon state 
agencies.44 
In 1977, largely in response to the 1974 OPEC oil embargo and 
energy crisis, Congress enacted the Department of Energy Organi-
zation Act.45 In Title IV of the Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission was established,46 replacing the Federal Power Com-
mission. FERC was granted several powers formerly held by the 
Federal Power Commission,47 including those powers concerning 
the regulation of electric utilities.48 
As late as 1970, only a very small percentage of electric power was 
transmitted across state lines.49 The direct control of the FPC there-
fore has not been as broad as would appear, and the bulk of authority 
and regulation continue at the state level. 50 Regulation of electric 
utilities and electric power rates by the FPC, and now the FERC, 
was, and still is, generally regarded as supplementary to utility and 
rate regulation by the states. 51 
The federal Commission's efforts in the last twenty years have 
focused on broader policy issues in electric utility regulation; protect-
ing consumer interests, 52 increasing economic efficiency o~ the utili-
ty industry, 53 seeking quality services, 54 coordinating power plan-
42. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1976). 
43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825r (1976). 
44. PURPA Title I (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2634 (Supp. V 1981» and Title II (codified 
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 796-825r (Supp. V 1981» both require state agencies to "consider" certain 
federal standards in establishing rates for electric power. 
45. Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
46. Title IV § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (Supp. IV 1980). 
47. Id. § 402, 42 U.S.C. S 7172 (Supp. IV 1980). 
48. Id. § 402(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. S 7172(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). 
49. In 1970, interstate electric power transmission represented only 7.3 percent of the total 
U.S. power transmission. S. BREYER, supra note 18, at 11. 
50. See generally id. 
51. Id. at 91. 
52. Id. at 1-2. The FPC has acted to voice concerns of some consumer interest groups in 
dealing with the utilities. Id. 
53. Id. at 3. The FPC entered planning and forecasting activities of the utility industry with 
the intent of increasing production and reducing costs. Id. at 1-2. 
54. Id. at 12. The FPC has acted to require larger producers of electric power to sell to 
smaller retailers in an attempt to insure a more consistent power source for the smaller 
retailers. Id. 
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ning,55 and encouraging interconnections between electric utilities 
and power pooling.56 Thus, the Commission's involvement prior to 
PURP A did not impinge directly on state regulatory agencies. 
With the enactment of PURP A in 1978, Congress appeared to go 
beyond the previous scope and nature of federal control over public 
utility regulation. Specifically, the provisions in PURPA directing 
state regulatory agencies to consider specific federal standards57 
went beyond the previous scope of the Federal Power Act. The man-
ner in which PURP A expanded federal control affected the accept-
ance of PURP A by the states due to the changes in state authority 
and procedures regarding utility regulation mandated by PURP A. 
Provisions of PURP A established new standards and methods for 
state public utility commissions to implement in order to encourage 
cogeneration and small power production. 
III. THE PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY POLICIES ACT OF 1978 
In 1978, Congress enacted the National Energy Act (NEA).58 
Comprised of five separate Acts,59 the NEA established an extensive 
program to promote a comprehensive national energy policy.60 Two 
55. [d. at 92. Especially through the 1960's, the Commission strongly encouraged utilities to 
cooperate in planning their future needs and capacities. The Commission hoped to even out in-
consistencies in service between areas with different power needs. See id. 
56. [d. at 91-99. Interconnection between utilities is considered a safety measure, as it 
allows adjoining utilities to compensate for sudden localized loss of power. Power pooling 
generally involves three steps: 
(1) interconnection of generating systems; 
(2) coordinated production for transmission reliability; and 
(3) centralized dispatching control. 
Interconnection between utilities can lower the total amount of reserve capacity needed for 
sudden fluctuations, and thus lower overall costs. Coordinated power planning can reduce 
social costs by involving different forms of energy sources over a given area. Thus, a particular 
area may be able to rely, if necessary, on power produced in another area using another raw 
fuel. For example, in 1976 several Midwest states were adversely affected by an extended coal 
strike, which significantly reduced the amount of coal available to produce electricity. The ex-
istence of a more extensive power pool could have mitigated the effect, where surrounding 
states were not heavily dependent upon coal-powered electricity. 
57. See infra text at notes 181-89. 
58. For a summary of the NEA legislative history, see H.R. REP. No. 543, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7673 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 
No. 543]. See also President's comments upon signing National Energy Bills, 1978 PUB. 
PAPERS 1978, 1979 (Nov. 9, 1978). 
59. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617; Energy Tax Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618; National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619; 
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620; Natural Gas Policy Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621,1978 PUB. PAPERS 1985. 
60. See H.R. REP. No. 543, supra note 58, at 3. 
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of the principal goals of the NEA were energy conservation and de-
creased dependence on imported oil. 61 As one of the five Acts com-
prising the NEA, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURP A) plays an important role in reaching those goals. PURP A is 
designed to increase the use of renewable resources to meet the 
ever-increasing need for electric power generation and encourage 
the use of cogeneration for more efficient energy production. 62 
A. Provisions ojPURPA 
The PURP A provisions designed to encourage efficient electricity 
generation and the use of renewable resources focus on incentives 
for the development of cogeneration and small power production fa-
cilities.63 In order to encourage cogenerators and small power pro-
ducers, Congress recognized the need to ensure a market for power 
produced by those facilities. 64 Toward that end, PURP A requires 
that utilities interconnect with cogenerators and small power pro-
ducers that meet certain qualifications for the purpose of purchasing 
electric power. 66 PURP A also establishes standards for determining 
the rates that a utility must pay for such power. Additionally, 
PURP A requires that state utility commissions exempt from regula-
tion those cogenerators and small power producers that meet 
federally-prescribed statutory qualifications.66 PURP A delegated to 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to 
promulgate regulations with regard to small power production and 
cogeneration.67 
1. Qualification Standards 
PURP A amended portions of the Federal Power Act,68 and added 
new sections to the Act. PURPA section 210,69 for example, added 
new provisions directing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion to prescribe rules to be followed by state regulatory agencies 
61. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7678. 
62. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 7798-7800. 
63. PURPA § 210, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. V 1981). 
64. Lock and Van Kuiken, Cogeneration and Small Power Production: State Implementa-
tion ojSection 210 ojPURPA, 3 SOLAR L. REP. 659, 661 (1981). 
65. PURPA § 202, 16 U.S.C. § 824i (Supp. V 1981). 
66. Id. § 210(e), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (Supp. V 1981). 
67. Id. § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
68. See supra notes 39-40. 
69. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824a-3 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
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and by non-regulated utilities,70 "to encourage cogeneration and 
small power production [of electricity]."71 There are three essential 
elements of section 210 which apply only to qualified72 facilities. The 
first requires FERC to establish rules which would require electric 
utilities to sell electric power t073 and purchase electric power from74 
qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities. The 
second contains provisions which require FERC to set standards for 
determining the rates for electric power sold by those qualifying fa-
cilities.75 The third element requires the exemption of cogenerators 
and small power producers from regulation by state agencies. 76 
Section 20177 of PURP A sets forth qualifying criteria for 
cogenerators and small power producers. Qualifying criteria include: 
specifications of the "primary energy source"78 allowable for small 
power producers;79 maximum generating OUtput;80 restriction on 
70. A nonregulated electric utility is one that is not subject to regulation by a state 
regulatory agency under the laws of that state. Utilities owned by municipalities or by 
publicly-held corporations, for example, may be nonregulated utilities. See P. GARFIELD, supra 
note 10, at 261. Such utilities are still subject to the provisions of PURP A § 210, but are not 
discussed here. 
71. 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). The rules were to be issued only after FERC had 
given public notice and had allowed interested parties an opportunity to comment. The Com-
mission was to consult with representatives of state and federal regulatory agencies having 
ratemaking authority over electric utilities, and was to allow those representatives to submit 
written data, views, and arguments. Id. 
72. "Qualified" facilities are those cogeneration and small power production facilities that 
meet the standards of PURPA § 201, 16 U.S.C. § 796 (Supp. V 1981). 
73. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(aX1) (Supp. V 1981). The standards of the rates for sale to qualifying 
facilities, as promulgated by FERC, were to be; "(1) just and reasonable and in the public in-
terest, and (2) [nondiscriminatory] against the qualifying cogenerators or qualifying small 
power producers." Id. § 824a-3(c). 
74. Id. § 824a-3(a). For a discussion of the standards for the purchase rates, see infra text at 
notes 124-36. 
75. 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(b) (Supp. V 1981). See infra text and notes at notes 124-30. 
76. 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(e) (Supp. V 1981). One of the major barriers to cogenerators and 
small power producers prior to PURP A was the risk of being considered a public utility, and 
therefore subject to extensive regulatory requirements under a state public utility commission 
(PUC). The intent of Congress was to remove this barrier for facilities meeting the standards 
discussed infra text at notes 77-88. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 7831-32. 
77. 16 U.S.C. S 796(17)-(22) (Supp. V 1981). 
78. The "primary energy source" is the fuel or fuels used for generation of electricity, ex-
cept that auxiliary fuels used for ignition, testing, or control are not considered. PURP A § 
201(17XB), 16 U.S.C. S 796(17XB) (Supp. V 1981). 
79. Energy sources allowable for small power producers are: biomass, waste (production of 
electricity by burning), renewable (e.g., wind and solar), and geothermal sources. Id. § 
201(17XA), 16 U.S.C. S 796(17XA) (Supp. V 1981). 
80. In order to qualify under S 201, a small power producer must have a maximum output of 
80 mega~watts (MW) of electricity (one mega-watt equals one million watts). Id. § 
201(17)(A)(ii), 16 U.S.C. S 796(17XA)(ii) (Supp. V 1981). Furthermore, a small power producer 
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ownership of the facility to "a person not primarily engaged in the 
generation or sale of electric power,"81 and, for cogeneration 
facilities only, the requirement that the facility produce electric 
energy and another form of useful energy concurrently. 82 Section 
201 also orders FERC to prescribe standards for fuel use,83 fuel effi-
ciency,84 minimum size,86 and reliability of service86 to be met by 
cogenerators and small power producers in order to qualify for ex-
emption from regulation. Facilities meeting these various criteria 
are designated "qualifying facilities." 
2. Exemption Provisions 
Congress deemed that exemption from the type and extent of 
regulation ordinarily imposed upon any utility selling power is 
necessary in order to encourage the production and sale of electricity 
by cogenerators and small power producers.87 PURPA section 210 
requires the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to prescribe 
rules exempting qualifying facilities from regulation by federal or 
state regulatory commissions. Section 210(e) provides that the rules 
exempt such facilities "in whole or in part" if FERC finds that such 
exemption is "necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power 
production. "88 
Congress, in section 210(e),89 also ordered FERC to prescribe 
rules exempting qualifying facilities90 from the Federal Power Act 
with an energy source other than geothermal or biomass may not be exempt from all regula-
tion if maximum output is over 30 MW. Id. § 210(e)(2), 16 U.S.C. 824a-3(e)(2) (Supp. V 1981). 
81. PURPA § 201(17)(C)(ii), 16 U.S.C. S 796(17)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1981). This definition does 
not include the sale of power by a qualifying facility. 
82. A qualifying facility must produce "(i) electric energy, and (ii) steam or forms of useful 
energy (such as heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating or cooling purposes." 
Id. § 201(18)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A) (Supp. V 1981). 
83. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(C)(i) (Supp. V 1981). Fuel use standards establish the types of raw 
fuels permissible for qualified facilities. 
84. 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1981). Fuel efficiency standards set forth the 
allowable ratio of energy input to energy output for qualified facilities. 
85.Id. 
86. I d. § 796(17)(C)(i). 
87. See supra note 76. 
88. PURPA § 210(e)(I), 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(e)(l) (Supp. V 1981). 
89. 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(e) (Supp. V 1981). 
90. Qualification for exemption under this subsection is more restricted than for the rest of 
the section. A small power producer with power production capacity over 30 MW. or a small 
power producer using geothermal energy with capacity over 80 MW. may not be exempted by 
the FERC rules from Federal Power Act jurisdiction. The Commission must then set the rates 
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(FPA),91 the Public Utility Holding Company Act,92 and state laws 
governing rates or other regulation of electric utilities. The Commis-
sion, however, may not prescribe rules exempting qualifying 
facilities from state laws or regulations implementing the provisions 
of PURP A, 93 from any license or permit requirement under the 
Federal Power Act,94 or from the PURP A provisions concerning 
"interconnection"96 and "wheeling."96 Cogenerators and small 
power producers are not exempt from these provisions because the 
provisions require those qualifying facilities to share with a utility 
the costs of interconnection and wheeling.97 
3. Interconnection and Wheeling Provisions 
Section 20298 of PURP A deals with interconnection, which is the 
physical connection necessary for electricity transfer. "Wheeling" of 
power, which is the transfer of electric power from its source to 
another utility's lines, is covered by section 211.99 Section 202 grants 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authority to order a 
utility to interconnect with a qualifying cogenerator, small power 
producer, or geothermal power producer .100 The Commission may 
order such interconnection upon a motion by an affected utility or 
qualifying facility, 101 upon application by the state regulatory 
authority,102 or upon its own motion. 103 Subsequent to issuing notice 
for the sale of power by such a facility according to the provisions of the Federal Power Act. 
Id. § 824a-3(e)(2). See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 7833. 
91. Codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825r (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The FPA has 
jurisdiction over electricity sold interstate, and over all wholesale electric power transactions. 
16 U.S.C. § 824 (Supp. V 1981). 
92. Chapter 687, Title I, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976 
& Supp. V 1981». 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1981). 
94. Id. § 824a-3(e)(3)(C). 
95. Interconnection is discussed infra text and notes at notes 98-123. 
96. Wheeling is discussed infra text and notes at notes 107-123. 
97. PURPA § 210(e)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1981). 
98. 16 U.S.C. § 824i (Supp. V 1981). 
99. Id. § 824j. 
100. Id. § 824i(a). 
101. Id. § 824i(a)(1). 
102. Id. § 824i(a)(2). 
103. Id. § 824i(d). FERC may on its own motion issue an order concerning interconnection 
and wheeling consistent with the statutory guidelines, except for orders with respect to a fed-
eral power marketing agency (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority), which may only be 
issued upon application by an affected party. Id. § 824i(a)(2). If FERC does not issue upon ap-
plication an interconnection or wheeling order, it is required to deny the application. Id. 
§ 824k(d). 
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to each affected utility and to the public, FERC must hold a hearing 
on the issue of ordering a connection between the utility and the 
qualifying facility for the purpose of selling or exchanging electrici-
ty.104 Section 202 requires that an interconnection order issued by 
FERC be "in the public interest,"105 and that it "(A) encourage 
overall conservation of energy or capital, (B) optimize the efficiency 
of use of facilities and resources, or (C) improve the reliability of any 
electric utility system ... to which the order applies."106 
Section 203107 of PURPA deals with wheeling of electricity. 
"Wheeling" is the transfer of electricity by a utility from the pro-
ducer of the electricity to another utility that is buying the power 
from the producer. If the producer is not within the area of service of 
the purchasing utility, FERC may order a utility between the pro-
ducer and purchaser to wheel, or transfer, the power to the pur-
chaser.108 To issue an order for wheeling, FERC must determine 
that such order: 
(1) is in the public interest, 
(2) would - (A) conserve a significant amount of energy, (B) 
significantly promote the efficient use of facilities and resources, 
or (C) improve the reliability of any electric system to which the 
order applies, and 
(3) meets the requirements of [PURP A section 204].109 
In addition, a wheeling order may be issued only if FERC determines 
that it "would reasonably preserve existing competitive relation-
ships,"l1O would not result in the utility wheeling power that would 
replace what that utility would otherwise sell,111 would not be incon-
sistent with existing state laws,112 or would not provide transmission 
directly to an ultimate consumer.113 
104. [d. § 824i(b). Subsequent to a hearing, FERC may order the actual physical intercon-
nection, and may also order either party to take steps to make such a connection effective, e.g., 
increase transmission capacity or install safeguards to maintain reliability of the interconnec-
tion. [d. § 824a-3(a)(1)(A-D). 
105. [d. § 824i(c)(1). 
106. [d. § 824i(c)(2). 
107. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (Supp. V 1981). 
108. [d. § 824j(a). An application for wheeling may be brought only by a utility, a geothermal 
power producer, or a federal power marketing agency. FERC may not issue a wheeling order 
upon its own motion. [d. 
109. PURP A § 203(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
110. [d. § 203(c)(I), 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c)(1). 
111. [d. § 203(c)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c)(2). 
112. [d. § 203(c)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c)(3). 
113. [d. § 203(c)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c)(4). 
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An order by FERC under section 202 must also meet the re-
quirements of section 204 of PURP A.114 Section 204115 allows FERC 
to issue an order regarding interconnection or wheeling only if it will 
not likely result in an uncompensated economic 10ss116 or an undue 
burden 117 on either party, or if it will not impair the reliability of the 
utility,118 or its ability to adequately serve its customers.l19 
Section 204 also states that FERC may not order any interconnec-
tion or wheeling unless the applicant for the order (typically, the 
qualifying facility) demonstrates that it is "ready, willing, and able to 
reimburse the party subject to the order ... " (typically, the utility) 
for its share of interconnection costs and for the reasonable costs of 
wheeling power.120 Before issuing a final order for interconnection 
or wheeling, FERC must issue a proposed order121 and allow the par-
ties a reasonable time to reach an agreement on their own regarding 
the terms and conditions of the order .122 All agreed upon terms and 
conditions are subject to review by FERC.123 
4. Rate-Setting Provisions 
Section 210 requires FERC to prescribe rules for setting the rates 
that electric utilities must pay to qualifying facilities. 124 The rules are 
to ensure that the rates will be "just and reasonable to the con-
sumers of the electric utility and in the public interest"125 and "not 
discrimina[tory] against qualifying cogenerators or qualifying small 
power producers."126 One other restriction included is that "[n]o 
such rule ... shall provide for a rate which exceeds the incremental 
cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy."127 Section 
114. 16 U.S.C. § 824i(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
115. 16 U.S.C. § 824k (Supp. V 1981). This section applies both to interconnection and 
wheeling orders by FERC. 
116. Id. § 824k(a)(I). 
117. Id. § 824k(a)(2). 
118. Id. § 824k(a)(3). 
119. Id. § 824k(a)(4). 
120. Id. § 824k(b). 
121. Id. § 824k(c)(I). 
122. Id. The proposed order is not enforceable in court. Id. 
123. Id. It is Congress' intent that FERC not disapprove terms or conditions agreed to be-
tween parties unless those terms or conditions may be detrimental to the taxpayer or inconsis-
tent with PURPA §§ 202-204, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i-824k (Supp. V 1981). CONFERENCE REPORT, 
supra note 15, at 7828. 
124. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. V 1981). 
125. Id. S 824a-3(b)(I). 
126. Id. S 824a-3(b)(2). 
127. Id. S 824a-3(b) (emphasis added). This requirement reflects Congress' desire to en-
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210 then defines "incremental cost" as "the cost to the electric utili-
ty which, but for the purchase from such cogenerator or small power 
producer, such utility would generate or purchase from another 
source."128 The Conference Report mentioned several times that 
qualifying facilities should not be burdened by the same type of 
regulation imposed upon utilities. 129 By providing for a rate struc-
ture based on the utilities' cost of operation rather than the costs of 
the qualifying facility, Congress was allowing qualifying facilities to 
avoid extensive regulatory scrutiny. 130 
In PURP A section 210(£)131 Congress required that the state 
regulatory agencies-usually a state public utility commission in each 
state-implement, after notice and an opportunity for hearing, the 
rules promulgated by FERC.132 In so doing, PURPA did not expand 
the jurisdiction of any state public utility commission since the state 
commissions were ordered to enforce the PURP A provisions only 
upon those utilities already under their control.133 
courage cogeneration and small power production while protecting the interests of the electric 
consumer. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 7831-32. A rate payable to a qualify-
ing facility that exceeded the incremental cost could result in greater overall cost to the con-
sumer. See infra note 128. 
128. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d) (Supp. V 1981). "Incremental cost" is sometimes called "avoided 
cost," or is referred to as a "marginal rate." Generally, the base load of a utility is met by large 
generating units using lower-cost fuels such as coal. Smaller generating units, fired up only as 
needed to meet higher load requirements, use more expensive fuels such as oil or gas. The in-
cremental cost is based on the last units to be fired up by the utility - called "peaking units" -
so that the power produced by a qualifying facility is considered to be replacing the most ex-
pensive power produced by the utility. Therefore, if a utility is required to pay 100% of in-
cremental cost to a qualifying facility, then during periods of low demand when peaking units 
are not operating, the utility may pay more for power from the qualifying facility than what it 
would cost the utility to produce the power itself. See generally, A. KAHN, supra note 11, at 
63-83. 
129. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 7831-32. 
130. ld. at 7831. Congress also recognized that the qualifying facilities would not have a 
guaranteed rate of return, as do utilities, and would be assuming greater risks than utilities en-
counter. ld. at 7831-32. A second issue regarding rate determination is the amount of weight 
to be given competing standards by the utility commission. 
The standard that rates be "just and reasonable ... and in the public interest," 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824a-3(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981), calls for a lower rate to be paid to a qualifying facility, so that the 
prices for the electric consumer may be kept down. However, the encouragement of cogenera-
tion and small power production, in order to ultimately reduce dependence on fossil fuels, may 
necessitate paying rates to qualifying facilities that would result in increased costs to the elec-
tric consumer. While the overall policies of the energy acts were clearly spelled out, see supra 
text and notes at notes 58-61, there was no direction given FERC as to balancing those policies 
with the requirement of "just and reasonable" rates. 
131. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (Supp. V 1981). 
132. ld. § 824a-3(f)(1). 
133. ld. A public utility commission might not have authority over a municipal utility or one 
exempted from state control by state legislation. 
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Section 210 of PURP A gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission the power to enforce its rules made pursuant to PURP A 
with respect to any utility or qualifying facility subject to FERC 
jurisdiction.l34 The Commission also has the power to force state 
regulatory agencies to comply with the FERC regulations under 
PURP A.l35 This power to enforce adoption of the PURP A provi-
sions, however, is the sole extent of FERC's authority over state 
regulatory agencies. l36 
B. Federal Regulatory Action Under PURPA 
After the passage of PURP A, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission promulgated regulations with regard to cogeneration 
and small power production facilities. l37 These regulations prescribe 
arrangements between electric utilities and qualifying facilities for 
interconnection, wheeling, and purchase and sale rates of electric 
power. l3S 
The basic obligations imposed upon the utilities by FERC include: 
the obligation to purchase power from qualifying facilities;l39 the 
obligation to sell power to qualifying facilities;140 the obligation to in-
terconnect with those facilities for the purpose of purchasing and 
selling power;l4l the obligation to wheel electric power from the 
qualifying facility to another utility;l42 and the obligation to offer to 
134. PURPA S 210(h), 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(h) (Supp. V 1981). 
135. [d. S 824a-3(h)(2). FERC may bring an enforcement action on its own, id. § 824a-
3(h)(2)(A), or upon petition by a utility or qualifying facility, id. § 824a-3(hX2)(B). Any utility or 
qualifying facility may petition FERC to enforce the FERC regulations and, if FERC fails to 
act within 60 days of such petition, may initiate an action for enforcement of the FERC regula-
tions. [d. 
136. [d. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A): 
No enforcement action may be brought by the Commission [FERC] under this section 
other than-
(i) an action against the state regulatory authority ... for failure to comply with the 
requirements of subsection (f) of this section [requiring state regulatory agencies to 
implement the FERC rules) .... 
137. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.101-292.602 (1982). For an explanation of the FERC regulations in 
Part 292, see 45 Fed. Reg. 12,233, 17,959 (1980). 
138. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.301-292.308 (1982). 
139. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a): "Each electric utility shall purchase [at rates determined under 
§ 292.304), any energy and capacity which is made available from a qualifying facility." 
140. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(b) (1982). The rates for sales are to be "just and reasonable and in 
the public interest," id. § 292.305(a)(1)(i), and nondiscriminatory, id. § 292.305(a)(1)(ii). The in-
tent is that the qualifying facility pay the same rate as would a consumer in the same class with 
the same power demand characteristics, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,228 (1982). 
141. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c) (1982). The qualifying facility might have to share the costs of 
the interconnection. [d. § 292.306. 
142. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(d) (1982). 
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operate in parallel with the qualifying facility ("simultaneous trans-
action" rule).143 General requirements for small power production 
facilities include maximum power output,144 fuel use,145 and owner-
ship criteria. 146 
The scope of the FERC rules respecting purchases and sales of 
electric power between qualifying facilities and utilities does not 
preclude the parties from negotiating their own agreements147 or in-
validate any existing contract between those parties.148 The FERC 
rules, however, do establish a framework for electric power sales by 
qualifying facilities149 and require state public utility commissions to 
implement the FERC rules.150 
143. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(e) (1982). Under a "simultaneous transaction", the qualifying 
facility is deemed to be selling all the power it produces to the utility, and purchasing all the 
power it needs from the utility. The amount payable by either party depends on the difference 
in electricity produced times the applicable rate and electricity purchased times the applicable 
rate. 
144. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203(a)(l) (1982). "The power production capacity of the facility for 
which qualification is sought, together with the capacity of any other facilities which use the 
same energy resource, are owned by the same person, and are located at the same site, may 
not exceed 80 megawatts." ld. § 292.204(a). 
145. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203(a)(2) (1982). The primary energy source of the facility must be 
biomass, waste, renewable resources, or any combination thereof, and 75% or more of the 
total energy input must be from these sources. ld. § 292.204(b)(1)(i). 
146. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203(a)(3) (1982): 
General Rule 
(a) A cogeneration facility or small power production facility may not be owned by a 
person primarily engaged in the generation or sale of electric power (other than elec· 
tric power solely from cogeneration facilities or small power production facilities). 
(b) Ownership Test. For purposes of this section, a cogeneration or small power pro-
duction facility shall be considered to be owned by a person primarily engaged in the 
generation or sale of electric power, if more than 50 percent of the equity interest in 
the facility is held by an electric utility or utilities, or by an electric utility holding 
company, or companies, or any combination thereof. 
ld. § 292.206(a)-(b). This provision precludes utilities from gaining controlling interest in a 
qualifying facility. 
147. 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b)(1) (1982): 
Nothing in this subpart: 
(1) Limits the authority of any electric utility or any qualifying facility to agree to a 
rate for any purchase, or terms or conditions relating to any purchase, which differ 
from the rate or terms or conditions which would otherwise be required by this sub-
part. 
See infra note 390. 
148. ld. § 292.301(b)(2): "Nothing in this subpart ... (2) Affects the validity of any contract 
entered into between a qualifying facility and an electric utility for any purchase." 
149. ld. § 292.304. 
150. ld. § 292.401(a): 
Not later than one year after these rules take effect, each State regulatory authority 
shall, after notice and an opportunity for public hearing, commence implementation 
of Subpart C [rules respecting arrangements between utilities and qualifying facili-
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The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission also established 
standards by which a state public utility commission could determine 
the rate payable to a qualifying facility for power. 151 The regulations 
provide that the standards of PURPA section 210(b)152 will be met if, 
after considering the capacity of both the utility and the qualifying 
facility and the ability of the utility to defer costs by relying on the 
qualifying facility's power,153 the public utility commission estab-
lishes a rate equal to the utility's avoided costs.154 The Commission 
indicated that a state public utility commission could establish a rate 
less than full avoided cost if it found such a rate to be consistent with 
the provisions of PURPA section 210(b) and "sufficient to encourage 
cogeneration and small power production."155 The Commission 
made it clear, however, that it preferred that rates be set at the max-
imum allowable level under PURPA section 210(b).156 This position 
met with resistance in both the utility and regulatory industries,157 
and a challenge to the FERC's standards was soon brought by the 
American Electric Power Corporation.158 
ties] .... Such implementation may consist of the issuance of regulations, an under-
taking to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising 
under Subpart C, or any other action reasonably designed to implement such subpart 
151. Id. § 292.304. 
152. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. V 1981). The standards of 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a) (1982) 
repeat the standards set out in 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. V 1981). See supra text at notes 
124-127. 
153. See supra note 125. The FERC rules in 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(eX3) (1982) indicate that, if 
energy from a qualifying facility would be sufficiently "firm," i.e., guaranteed to constantly be 
at or above a designated level, the public utility commission may consider as part of the avoid-
ed costs the cost of capital for expansion or replacement by the utility, since the purchase of 
power from the qualifying facility would defer the need for the utility to purchase that capital 
equipment. 
154. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(bX2) (1982). The Commission rejected a lower rate, which might 
have passed on savings to other consumers, by stating that the savings to each individual con-
sumer would be insignificant, and that the consumers and the public at large would benefit 
from the decreased use of fossil fuels. Other suggested methods for establishing lower rates 
were discarded as FERC thought those methods would subject the qualifying facilities to 
greater regulatory control, in contravention of one of the goals of PURPA § 210. See 45 Fed. 
Reg. 12,222 (1980). The basis for the FERC decision to establish the rate at full avoided cost 
was one of the issues in American Electric Power Co. v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 
1982), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983). See infra text and notes at 244-92. 
155. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(bX3) (1982). 
156. See 45 Fed. Reg. 12,222 (1980). FERC thought that the maximum allowable rate best 
reflected the PURP A policy of encouraging cogeneration and small power production. 
157. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, October 7, 1982; 
telephone interview with Thomas R. Morton, Vice President, Windfarms, Ltd., October 26, 
1982. 
158. See infra discussion of American Electric in the text at notes 244-92. 
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The lawsuit against FERC represents one of the conflicts brought 
about by PURP A.159 While cases generally uphold federal regulatory 
authority over utilities, they have left questions of complex reg-
ulatory interactions unresolved. The interaction of federal law and 
state agency authority has created a "gray area" of uncertainty in 
the enforcement of PURP A.160 This gray area has been used by 
utilities and regulators to hamper the implementation of the PURP A 
goals. 161 The nature of this interaction must be examined in order to 
analyze the effectiveness of PURP A in promoting cogeneration and 
small power facility development. 
IV. PROBLEMS GENERATED BY V ARIOUS LEVELS OF 
REGULATORY CONTROL 
Presently, regulation of electric utilities occurs through four dif-
ferent levels of authority. These four levels include: federallegisla-
tion; federal regulatory agency rules and decisions, such as rules 
and decisions by the FERC; state legislation; and state regulatory 
agency rules and decisions--in this case, usually rules and decisions 
of a state public utility commission. The interaction of state and 
federal laws and regulations gives rise to conflicts which invoke 
issues of federalism,162 preemption,163 and administrative law.164 As 
159. In American Electric, infra text at notes 244-92, the petitioner challenged the FERC 
regulations, and argued that the regulations were not in compliance with PURP A. In 
Mississippi, infra text at notes 205-43, the State of Mississippi challenged the constitutionali-
ty of PURP A. Mississippi claimed that the federal government could not impose federal 
regulatory standards upon state regulators. 
160. See the discussion of regulatory control of utilities infra text and notes at notes 
295-342. 
161. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, October 7,1982. 
162. Federalism is a term which includes the relationship between the states and the federal 
government. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551 (5th ed. 1979). 
163. Preemption is a doctrine holding that certain matters are of such a national concern 
that federal laws take precedence over state or local laws regarding those matters. As such, 
states may not pass statutes inconsistent with federal law in an area of concern preempted by 
the federal government. Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, S 2 of the Constitution, 
federal judgment is deemed to preempt state judgment concerning matters within the power 
of the federal government. See, e.g. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp, 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 
1979); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1977); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U.S. 833 (1976); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct 1054 
(1983). For a discussion of the preemption of utility regulation by PURP A see infra text at 
notes 205-44. 
164. See, e.g. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); California v. Tayler, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); 
Washington v. Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). Administrative law issues are 
discussed in the analysis of American Electric v. FERC, and FERC v. Mississippi, infra text 
at notes 205-92. 
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noted earlier,165 the bulk of utility regulation has occurred at the 
state level. Furthermore, prior to PURP A, federal standards in utili-
ty regulation had never been imposed upon state regulatory agen-
cies. PURPA brought about a change in this policy, as provisions of 
PURP A require state public utility commissions to implement cer-
tain federal standards,166 and to "consider" other federal 
standards.167 PURP A thus expanded the scope of federal regulatory 
jurisdiction over utilities and over state utility commissions, bringing 
many diverse reactions.16S Many states proceeded to adopt the 
PURP A provisions and FERC regulations.169 There were also chal-
lenges to the PURPA provisions, however, and those challenges fo-
cused on the interaction of the various levels of authority for imple-
menting PURP A. Therefore, provisions of PURP A requiring action 
on the part of FERC and of state agencies will be considered, and 
major court cases contesting PURP A and the FERC regulations will 
be analyzed. 
A. Federal/State Interaction Under PURPA 
In order to encourage cogenerators and small power producers, 
PURP A includes not only provisions ensuring that those facilities 
can find a market for their power,170 but also provisions requiring 
state regulatory agencies to consider the federally-promulgated 
standards.171 The provisions are, either directly or indirectly, 172 
aimed toward requiring or encouraging state public utility commis-
sions to support cogeneration and small power production. Given the 
prominence of state regulation in the past, the exact nature of the 
federal entrance into traditional state matters and the reaction of 
the states are important concerns. 
165. See supra text and notes at note 18. 
166. For example, PURPA § 210(f)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f)(1) (Supp. v 1981), requires that 
states implement the FERC regulations promulgated pursuant to PURPA § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
167. For example, PURPA § 111(a), 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (a) (Supp. V 1981), requires that each 
state regulatory authority consider each federal retail electric rate standard. 
168. See Jones, The National Energy Act and State Commission Regulation, 30 CASE WES. 
RES. L. REV. 324, 336-37 (1980). 
169. Lock, supra note 64, at 664. 
170. PURPA § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
171. PURPA § 210(t), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(t) (Supp. V 1981). 
172. PURPA § 210(t), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(t) (Supp. V 1981) specifically requires state public 
utility commissions to adopt federal rules. On the other hand, PURPA § 210(e), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824a-3(e) (Supp. V 1981) requires FERC to prescribe rules for exempting qualifying 
facilities. The FERC regulations in turn, 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c) (1982), require the state com-
missions to exempt qualifying facilities from certain state laws. 
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The provisions of PURP A expanded the scope of regulation by 
FERC over electric utilities to include setting standards for retail 
electric rates,l73 exempting qualifying facilities from state regula-
tion,174 and requiring utilities to purchase electric power from quali-
fying facilities. 175 The new scope of federal control went beyond the 
control of interstate and wholesale transaction rates and general 
regulatory policy that had previously outlined the major emphasis of 
the federal agencyJ76 In expanding the scope of FERC's authority, 
recognition had to be made of the historically limited exercise of 
federal powerl77 and the major role played by state public utility 
commissions in regulating utilities.178 PURPA needed to reflect the 
co-existence of federal and state regulatory control in the manner in 
which various federal requirements were imposed upon the state 
public utility commissions. 
For example, sections 111-117 of Title I of PURPA, 179 dealing with 
retail electric rate standards180 (and not with cogenerators or small 
power producers), direct the state regulatory authorities to "consid-
er each [federal] standard [for determining retail rates] and make a 
determination concerning whether or not it is appropriate to imple-
ment such standard to carry out the purposes of this chapter."181 
173. PURPA § 210(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. V 1981). 
174. [d. § 210(e), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (Supp. V 1981). 
175. [d. § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). No form of § 210 existed within the 
Federal Power Act prior to PURP A. 
176. See S. BREYER, supra note 18, at 1-13. 
177. See id. at 91. 
178. For a discussion concerning the problems of shifting the regulatory burden from the 
states to the federal government, see generally Jones, supra note 168, at 365; Grainey Recent 
Federal Energy Legislation: Toward a National Energy Policy at Last?, 12 ENVTL. L. 29, 41 
(1981); Lagassa, State Utility Commissions as Vestigial Organs: The Needfor Regional Gover-
nance of Electric Utilities, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 291 (1980). 
179. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621-2627 (Supp. V 1981). 
180. Retail electric rates are the rates charged to residential or commercial users; the rates 
are typically set by a state public utility commission after receiving data submitted by each 
utility. 
181. PURPA § 111, 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a) (Supp. V 1981): 
The purposes of this chapter are to encourage -
(1) conservation of energy supplied by electric utilities; 
(2) the optimization of the efficiency of use of facilities and resources by electric 
utilities; and 
(3) equitable rates to electric consumers. 
PURPA § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 2611 (Supp. V 1981). 
Sections 111-117 of Title I, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621-2627 (Supp. V 1981) outlined various retail elec-
tric metering rates to be considered by the state public utility commission. The different rate 
standards concerned setting electric rates according to usage, time of day, or other factors af-
fecting the demand for electric power. 
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The state public utility commissions, however, are not required to 
implement the federal ratemaking standards,182 though they may be 
directed to explain their failure to do SO.183 In this sense, the federal 
government's actions in Title I is more arm-twisting than making 
direct orders. 
In contrast, section 210 of PURPA does not deal as directly with 
the state public utility commissions, as it directs FERC to establish 
standards to encourage cogeneration and small power production 184 
and to exempt qualifying facilities from federal and state regulatory 
control.185 PURP A states, however, that the state public utility com-
missions are to implement the FERC standards regarding cogenera-
tion and small power production in a manner prescribed by FERC.186 
One effect of PURP A, therefore, was to require federal policies to be 
considered by the states. PURP A also requires other federal policies 
to be implemented according to the FERC standards promulgated 
under PURPA, and in a manner prescribed by FERC.187 Thus, the 
overall impact of PURP A upon state regulatory agencies would not 
be felt until FERC published regulations under PURP A. 
FERC regulations establish the second tier of authority under 
PURP A. Regulations promulgated under PURP A section 210 
establish three means by which a state public utility commission can 
implement the PURPA provisions regarding interconnections, pur-
chases, and sales of electric power between utilities and qualifying 
facilities. 188 The state public utility commissions can: (1) issue regula-
tions pursuant to the FERC guidelines; (2) attempt to resolve 
disputes between utilities and qualifying facilities; or (3) take "any 
other action reasonably designed to implement [the FERC standards 
under PURPA section 210]."189 Thus, the states are allowed a range 
of action in promoting PURP A. Even though the states can do little 
182. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a) (Supp. V 1981). "Nothing in this subsection prohibits any State 
regulatory authority ... from making any determination that it is not appropriate to imple-
ment any such standard .... " Id. 
183. Id. § 2621(c)(2): "If a State regulatory authority ... declines to implement any stand-
ard established by subsection (d) [regarding retail rates] ... such authority ... shall state in 
writing the reasons therefor." 
184. See supra text at notes 69-75. 
185. See supra text at note 76. 
186. PURPA § 210(f)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f)(I) (Supp. V 1981). 
187. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 150. 
188. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401 (1982). 
189. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401(a) (1982). Method (2), regarding dispute resolution is arguably an 
action that a state public utility commission would take even in the absence of the FERC 
regulations. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). See infra text at notes 205-43 for 
discussion of the Mississippi case. 
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to implement the FERC regulations,190 they cannot entirely avoid 
taking any action pursuant to PURP A.191 Therefore, the enactment 
of PURP A and the promulgation of the FERC regulations imposed 
duties upon the state public utilities commissions which were not 
previously required. 
After publication of the FERC regulations under PURP A, the 
state public utility commissions were given one year in which to 
begin implementing the PURP A standards and FERC regula-
tions.192 Many utilities have been slow to comply with those regula-
tions and have argued that the federal government does not have the 
power to force regulations upon state commissions.193 Some 
states,194 however, have not simply adopted the PURPA and FERC 
provisions, but have enacted statutes similar to PURPA (called 
"mini-PURPA's"), that require the respective state public utility 
commissions to implement regulations for exemption of qualifying 
facilities,195 for determining electric power rates payable to qualify-
ing facilities,196 and for requiring utilities to interconnect with quali-
fying facilities. 197 These mini-PURP A's exist in many different 
forms and variations,198 but they essentially follow some or all of the 
provisions of PURP A. The significance of the mini-PURP A's is two-
fold: (1) states are not precluded under PURP A from placing greater 
requirements upon utilities than are found in PURP A, in order to en-
courage cogeneration and small power production;199 and (2) the 
grant of authority to the state regulatory agency from the state 
190. State regulatory agencies would conform to the FERC regulations simply by "con-
sidering" the federal standards. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
191. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401(a) (1982). The wording of the FERC regulations is: "each State 
regulatory authority shall . .. commence implementation of [the regulations promulgated by 
the FERC]" (emphasis added). 
192. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401(a) (1982). 
193. See infra text and notes at notes 344-50. For a discussion of the major cases focusing 
on those arguments, see infra text and notes at notes 205-92. 
194. At least seventeen states have enacted legislation including some of the provisions of 
PURP A: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia. 
195. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 362-A § 2 (1982). 
196. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 362-A § 4 (1982). 
197. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 362-A § 3 (1982). 
198. See infra text and notes 364-89. 
199. There are no provisions in PURP A prohibiting states from setting rates higher than 
avoided cost (the maximum level in PURP A). When the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion promulgated the regulations under PURP A, it contended that "the States are free, under 
their own authority, to enact laws or regulations providing for rates which would result in even 
greater encouragement of [cogeneration and small power production]." 45 Fed. Reg. 12,221 
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rather than federal government removes the issue of whether the 
federal government can impose standards on a state agency. 200 
Since only a few states have enacted legislation regarding small 
power production and cogeneration development, in the majority of 
states the authority of the public utility commission to aid this 
development derives from federal legislation. Thus, in effect, in most 
states the public utility commission's authority is limited to the scope 
of PURP A. Furthermore, since PURP A delegated much regulatory 
control over cogeneration and small power production to FERC,201 
each public utility commission's authority to regulate such develop-
ment in states without mini-PURPA's is dependent upon the FERC 
regulations. Arguably, this represents a serious intrusion of federal 
authority into the domain of state government decision making. 
In 1982, PURP A withstood a constitutional challenge, and was 
declared a valid exercise of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause.202 In addition, the validity of the FERC regulations 
has been upheld by the Supreme Court.203 While these decisions have 
helped pave the way for cogeneration and small power development, 
the litigation surrounding PURP A stalled-at least tempo-
rarily-such development.204 A discussion of the issues raised 
against PURP A and the FERC regulations will allow a better 
understanding of state concerns in implementing PURP A. 
B. Major Court Decisions Under PURPA 
In the two major court cases that have arisen since the passage of 
PURP A and the promulgation of regulations by the Federal Energy 
(1980). There is an argument being advanced that PURPA has preempted the states from 
setting higher rate standards. The majority opinion in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 
(1982), seems to counter this argument. Justice B1ackmun made two references to Congress' 
ability to preempt the field to encourage cogeneration and small power production, but he also 
implied that Congress had not preempted the states from enacting laws similar to PURP A. 
456 U.S. at 771. This issue has yet to be resolved. Some states have set rates higher than 
avoided cost, and it is assumed for the purpose of this analysis that the states are not preemp-
ted from doing so. 
200. See infra the discussion of FERC v. Mississippi at notes 205-43. 
201. See supra text and notes at notes 173-92. 
202. See infra text at notes 211-17. 
203. See infra text at notes 271-72. 
204. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, Oct. 7, 1982. 
Telephone interview with Thomas R. Morton, Vice President, Windfarms, Ltd. Oct. 26, 1982. 
For example, a standard contract provision for contracts between Central Maine Power 
Company and qualifying facilities provides: "If after this agreement becomes effective Section 
210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act or 35 M.R.S.A. Chapter 172 [Maine mini-
PURP A 1 is repealed or modified so that Buyer is not required to purchase energy and capacity 
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Regulatory Commission, the challenges to PURP A have focused on 
two sets of issues. The first set of issues, which were raised in FERC 
v. Mississippi,206 involved a challenge to the power of Congress to 
pass legislation directly affecting state agencies. The state of 
Mississippi argued that PURP A was not a valid exercise of Congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause,206 and that PURP A un-
constitutionally infringed upon the states' sovereign immunity.207 
The second set of issues, raised in American Electric Power v. 
FERC,208 focused on the regulations promulgated by FERC.209 The 
challengers questioned FERC's adherence to the PURPA standards 
and tried to have declared invalid the FERC regulations concerning 
interconnection, purchase, and sale agreements between utilities 
and qualifying facilities. The Supreme Court held in American Elec-
tric that FERC had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously, nor had it 
exceeded its authority, in promulgating regulations under 
PURP A. 210 The Court's decision in Mississippi, upholding the con-
stitutionality of PURP A, has much significance regarding the im-
position of federal standards upon state agencies. 
1. FERC v. Mississippi 
The first major case brought against PURP A challenged its con-
stitutionality. Mter the promulgation of the FERC regulations 
under PURP A, a suit was brought by the state of Mississippi and the 
Mississippi Public Service Commission against FERC and the 
Secretary of Energy,211 challenging the constitutionality of Titles 
at avoided cost, Buyer reserves the right to terminate this agreement". NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., EXCERPTS FROM COGENERATION CONTRACTS 2 (1982). 
205. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
206. Brief for Appellees Mississippi and Mississippi Public Service Commission at 42, FERC 
v. American Electric Power Service Corporation, 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983). 
207. Brief for Appellees Mississippi and Mississippi Public Service Commission, supra note 
206, at 22. Mississippi argued that "PURP A interferes with the most basic attribute of state 
sovereignty. It interferes with the independent decision-making function of the Government of 
Mississippi in every area - legislative, administrative, and judicial." Id. 
208. 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd. 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983). 
209. See infra text and notes at notes 244-92. 
210. See infra text and notes at notes 271-92. 
211. The State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Public Service Commission brought suit in 
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. In a slip opinion, Justice 
Cox held that PURPA is "a clear usurpation of power and authority which the United States 
simply does not have under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." Mississippi v. FERC, 
No .• J79-0212(C), slip opinion at 9 (D. Miss. Feb. 27,1981). Finding the provisions of PURPA 
to be unconstitutional, Justice Cox cited the Supreme Court decision in National League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Cox found that provisions of PURPA, like provi-
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1212 and 111213 and section 210214 of PURP A. Those provisions re-
quire state public utility commissions to consider the federal stand-
ards for retail electric rates and for utility/qualifying facility 
agreements. The challenge was based on a claim that those parts of 
PURP A exceeded congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause215 and invaded state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth 
Amendment.216 The Supreme Court upheld the validity of PURP A, 
stating that Titles I and II of PURP A were not in violation of the 
Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment. 
All of the justices in Mississippi concurred in that part of the deci-
sion upholding congressional power to regulate electric utilities in in-
trastate commerce.217 The Court cited the congressional findings 
outlined in PURP A section 2218 that the regulated activities of 
generation, transmission and sale of electric power "have an imme-
diate effect on interstate commerce". 219 Citing FPC v. Florida 
Power and Light CO.,220 a case in which federal regulation of intra-
state power transmission had been upheld, the Court limited its in-
quiry under the Commerce Clause issue to determining whether the 
provisions of PURPA were rationally based. Noting the legislative 
history of PURP A in which Congress had cited the present ineffi-
cient generation of electricity, the Court held that limited regulation 
of retail sales of electricity and of the relationship between 
cogenerators and utilities was not an irrational means of encourag-
ing energy conservation and efficient use of natural resources. 221 
While the decision on the Commerce Clause issue was unanimous, 
the decision of the Court was sharply divided on the Tenth Amend-
ment question. 222 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated 
that PURP A section 210 "does nothing more than preempt conflic-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act at issue in National League of Cities, usurped the 
authority of Mississippi agencies to control sovereign functions. 
212. Codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2627 (Supp. V 1981). 
213. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (Supp. V 1981). 
214. Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. V 1981). 
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
216. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. 
10. See National League of Cities, supra note 211. 
217. 456 U.S. at 771-75. 
218. 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. V 1981). 
219. 456 U.S. at 755. 
220. 404 U.S. 453 (1972). 
221. 456 U.S. at 758. 
222. The Supreme Court split 5-4 on the Tenth Amendment issue. 
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ting state enactments in the traditional way."223 The majority opin-
ion went on to state that Congress could have preempted the states 
completely with respect to regulating retail electric sales of electrici-
ty and transactions between utilities and cogenerators.224 The re-
quirement that state public utility commissions implement the 
federal rules was upheld by the Court, which noted that one of the 
methods for implementation prescribed by FERC - undertaking to 
resolve disputes between utilities and qualifying facilities225--was 
"the very type of activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi 
Public Service Commission."226 
To support its holding that Congress could require state agencies 
to undertake certain activities, the majority cited Testa v. Katt227 
and National League of Cities v. Usery.228 In Testa, the Supreme 
Court upheld a federal statute that gave state courts jurisdiction to 
hear federal claims. There, the Court said that the federal govern-
ment had some power to enlist state branches of government in the 
furtherance of federal ends. 229 In National League of Cities, the 
Supreme Court held that a federal minimum wage requirement could 
not be applied to employees of a state government.230 The Court 
reasoned that the federal wage standard impermissibly affected the 
states' sovereign powers and their ability to determine their own 
governance. 231 The majority in Mississippi stated that PURP A did 
not conflict with National League of Cities because PURP A, in sup-
plying standards for state regulatory agencies, did not affect the 
states in their sovereign capacity or threaten the states' "separate 
and independent existence."232 According to the majority, since 
223. 456 U.S. at 759. 
224. [d. 
225. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401(a) (1982). 
226. 456 U.S. at 760. 
227. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
228. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
229. 330 U.S. at 393, quoted in 456 U.S. at 761. 
230. 426 U.S. at 833. The Supreme Court in National League of Cities established three fac-
tors for determining whether federal congressional action impinges upon state sovereign 
powers. Federal legislation will not be invalid under the Tenth Amendment if it does not: (1) 
regulate the "States as States," 426 U.S. at 854; (2) address "matters that are indisputably at-
tributes of state sovereignty," id. at 845; and (3) directly impair the states' ability to deter-
mine matters and structure operations in areas traditionally governed by the states, id. at 852. 
The Supreme Court has since modified this doctrine in Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983), by examining more closely the degree of federal 
intrusion into state matters, and determining whether the affected state function is a "core 
sovereign function." 103 S. Ct. at 1060-62. 
231. 426 U.S. at 851. 
232. 456 U.S. at 765, quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,76 (1869); Coyle 
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Congress could completely preempt the states in the regulation of 
electric utilities, they could "condition continued state involvement 
in a preemptible area on the consideration of federal proposals."233 
Justice Powell, dissenting on the Tenth Amendment issue, argued 
that PURP A imposed an "unprecedented" burden on the states in 
requiring them to adopt certain administrative and judicial func-
tions.234 Justice Powell argued that resolving the Commerce Clause 
issue by noting that Congress could completely preempt the field of 
utilities regulation still did not allow the federal government to force 
procedures upon state agencies and supplant procedures prescribed 
by the states for those agencies.235 
Justice O'Connor wrote more bluntly in dissent on the Tenth 
Amendment issue, stating that PURP A Titles I and II "conscript 
state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic army" con-
trary to the holding in National League ofCities.236 Justice O'Con-
nor cited a three-part test from National League of Cities for deter-
mining the validity of congressional actions affecting state agencies, 
namely, whether the legislation: (1) regulates the "States as 
States;"237 (2) "addresses matters that are indisputedly attribute[s] 
of state sovereignty;"238 and (3) "directly impair[s the States'] ability 
to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions.' "239 Justice O'Connor argued that according to those 
tests, PURP A invades the states' sovereignty since it mandates ac-
tion by the states,240 intrudes upon the states' power to set policies 
and make decisions,241 and affects the function of utility regulation 
that has traditionally been left to the stateS.242 
While PURP A section 210 was upheld in Mississippi, the widely 
disparate Supreme Court opinions do not indicate clear support for 
v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911). 
233. 456 U.S. at 765. 
234. Id. at 771. Justice Powell said that "PURPA ... breaks with [a] longstanding 
deference to principles of federalism." Id. at 772. 
235. Id. at 773. Justice Powell asserted that Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment 
limitations on Federal power are distinct and separate; satisfying one standard would not 
automatically mean satisfaction of the other. Id. 
236. Id. at 775. 
237. 456 U.S. at 778, quoting 426 U.S. at 854. 
238. 456 U.S. at 778, quoting 426 U.S. at 845. 
239. 456 U.S. at 778, quoting 426 U.S. at 852. 
240. 456 U.S. at 779. Justice O'Connor argued that Congress could have addressed its com-
ments to the utilities, rather than to state agencies. Id. 
241. Id. at 779. 
242. Id. at 781. 
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Congress' plan to shift regulatory authority over utilities to the fed-
eral government. This lack of support, coupled with the challenges to 
the FERC regulations in American Electric, caused a "chilling ef-
fect"243 on the development of cogeneration and small power pro-
duction facilities. 
2. American Electric Power v. FERC 
After FERC promulgated regulations under PURP A, the Ameri-
can Electric Power Service Corporation challenged those regula-
tions in federal court.244 American Electric Power Service Corpora-
tion questioned four provisions of the FERC rules: (1) FERC's "full 
avoided cost" rule for determining rates paid by utilities to qualify-
ing facilities;246 (2) FERC's "simultaneous transaction" rule for 
metering purchases and sales of electric power to or from qualifying 
facilities;246 (3) the grant of authority to qualifying facilities to inter-
connect with utilities without meeting the standards of sections 
210247 and 212248 of the Federal Power Act;249 and (4) FERC's fail-
ure to adopt fuel use criteria as a qualifying standard for cogenera-
tors.260 The challengers asserted that the FERC regulations went 
beyond the standards established by Congress in PURPA. 
American Electric Power Company contested the simultaneous 
transaction rule,261 arguing that the language of PURP A contem-
plated actual purchases and sales between the utility and the power 
producer, and not merely a calculation of the net energy flow. The 
circuit court upheld FERC's rule, however, noting that the language 
of PURPA did not require such a strict interpretation.252 The court 
also stated that FERC could reasonably have determined that such a 
rule promoted non-discriminatory rates for small power 
producers.263 
243. See supra note 204. 
244. 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev 'd. 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983). 
245. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(bX2) (1982). 
246. Id. § 292.303(e). See supra note 143. 
247. 16 U.S.C. § 824i (Supp. V 1981). The standards for allowing interconnection or requir-
ing wheeling are discussed supra text at notes 98-123. 
248. 16 U.S.C. § 824k (Supp. V 1981). 
249. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c) (1982). 
250. Id. Section 292.204 lists the qualifying criteria for cogeneration. 
251. 675 F.2d at 1238. The simultaneous transaction rule, 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(e) (1982), is 
discussed supra note 140. 
252. 675 F.2d at 1238. 
253. Id. 
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The petitioners also challenged FERC's decision not to include fuel 
use criteria in the definition for cogeneration facilities .. 254 The court 
upheld FERC's standards for qualifying characteristics, though, 
stating that FERC was not required to prescribe fuel use as a quali-
fying characteristic for cogenerators.255 The language of PURP A 
section 201 indicated only that FERC might use this characteristic, 
and not that FERC was mandated to prescribe fuel use as a qualify-
ing characteristic for cogeneration facilities. 256 According to the 
court, the language of PURP A section 201 was permissive, unlike 
the language of PURP A sections 210 and 212, and allowed FERC 
greater latitude in determining qualifying characteristics than in 
granting exemptions from regulation.257 
The circuit court struck down FERC's full avoided cost rule, 
holding that the result of such a rule would not be consistent with the 
PURP A mandate that rates payable to a qualifying facility be "just 
and reasonable to the consumers of the electric utility" and "in the 
public interest. "258 The court observed that Congress had intended 
for the full avoided cost to be the upper limit of the rate payable.259 
The court indicated that FERC might have been justified in choosing 
the maximum rate, but that FERC's rationale for its decision did not 
demonstrate consideration of all the competing factors, as required 
by PURP A section 21 O(b). 260 This issue was remanded for a deter-
mination of whether FERC had sufficiently considered the impact of 
its rate standard on the "consumers of the electric utility" as re-
quired by PURP A. 261 
The interconnection requirement - a very basic part of cogenera-
tion and small power production - was also struck down in A meri-
can Electric. The circuit court found that the FERC requirement 
that "any utility [shall interconnect with] any qualifying facility 
... "262 impermissibly exempted qualifying facilities from the safe-
254. 675 F.2d at 1241. 
255. [d. 
256. See id. "'[Q]uRIifying cogeneration facility' means a cogeneration facility which - (i) 
the Commission determines, by rule, meets such requirements ... as the Commission may, by 
rule, prescribe .... " (emphasis added). 16 U.S.C. S 796(18)(B) (Supp. V 1981). 
257. For a comparison of the discretion granted FERC in establishing qualifying criteria, 
see PURPA §§ 201(17) and 201(18), 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17) and 796(18) (Supp. V 1981). 
258. 675 F.2d at 1232, quoting PURPA § 210(c), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(c) (Supp. V 1981). 
259. See id. at 1233. For the PURPA S 210 standards, see supra text at notes 124-27. 
260. 675 F.2d at 1236. 
261. [d. 
262. 18 C.F.R. S 292.303(c) (1982). 
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guards in sections 210 and 212 of the FPA.263 These safeguards had 
also been placed in PURP A in order to protect the utilities and the 
public from potentially unsafe interconnections with qualifying facili-
ties.264 The court was not persuaded by FERC's argument that com-
pliance with sections 210 and 212 would unduly burden qualifying 
facilities in contravention of one of PURPA's stated goals.265 It held 
that FERC did not have the authority to issue exemptions from the 
FPA sections 210 and 212,266 stating that if the procedures are too 
burdensome on qualifying facilities, "the necessary amendment 
must come from Congress."267 
The Court of Appeals denied a rehearing en banc,268 and FERC ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. Even though the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case, the Appeals Court decision has had a "chill-
ing effect" on development of cogeneration and small power produc-
tion facilities. 269 This effect has been more pronounced in those 
states that do not have mini-PURPA's giving the state public utility 
commission authority to order interconnections and establish power 
rates.270 
After the circuit court decision, the Supreme Court accepted upon 
a writ of certiorari the appeal of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission in American Electric.271 The petitioners appealed the 
circuit court decisions concerning the avoided-cost rule and the inter-
connection rule. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,272 re-
versed the lower court on both issues. 
The Supreme Court began its discussion of the full-avoided-cost 
rule by noting that the proper standard of review was whether the 
FERC rule was "arbitrary and capricious."273 The Court stated that, 
263. 675 F.2d at 1240. PURPA § 210(eX3XB), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(eX3XB) (Supp. V 1981) 
directs that FERC may not exempt qualifying facilities from the safeguards in 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 824i-824k (Supp. V 1981). 
264. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 7826-28. 
265. PURPA § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). The Commission was to 
prescribe rules to encourage cogeneration. [d. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a). 
266. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i, 824k (Supp. V 1981). 
267. 675 F.2d at 1240. 
268. 675 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
269. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, Oct. 7, 1982. 
Telephone interview with Thomas R. Morton, Vice President, Windfarms, Ltd. Oct. 26, 1982. 
See supra note 204. 
270. [d. 
271. 74 L. Ed. 2d 165, 103 S. Ct. 206 (1982). 
272. The decision was 8-0; Justice Powell did not participate. 103 S. Ct. 1933. 
273. 103 S. Ct. at 1927. According to this standard of review, a court grants the agency 
much deference and will find a regulation invalid only if the agency's action in promulgating 
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under the appropriate standard, it must "determine whether the 
agency adequately considered the factors relevant to choosing a rate 
that will best serve the purposes of the statute .... "274 The criteria 
set forth in PURPA section 210(b)276 establish that the rate payable 
to qualifying facilities must be "just and reasonable to the electric 
consumers ... and in the public interest"276 and non-discriminatory 
to qualifying facilities. 277 Since the full-avoided-cost rule plainly does 
not discriminate against qualifying facilities,278 the Court noted that 
its consideration of the rule hinged only upon whether it meets the 
"just and reasonable" criteria.279 
In reviewing the legislative history of PURP A, the Supreme Court 
found a strong congressional intent to support energy-producing 
technology which utilizes non-fossil fuels. 280 The Commission could 
thus establish a rate that would "provide a significant incentive for a 
higher growth rate,"281 according to the Court, in order to benefit 
ratepayers and the public at large.282 Furthermore, the Court did not 
equate "just and reasonable" with "the lowest possible reasonable 
rate ... " as argued by the respondents.283 The Supreme Court held 
that, in light of the congressional intent to support cogeneration and 
small power production and to relieve qualifying producers from in-
trusive regulations, FERC's decision to prescribe the maximum rate 
authorized by PURP A was reasonable and therefore valid.284 
In its discussion of the FERC interconnection rule, the Court first 
noted that "[t]he authority to promulgate such rules as are necessary 
to require purchases and sales plainly encompasses the power to pro-
mulgate rules requiring utilities to make physical connections with 
the rule seems arbitrary. The Supreme Court also noted that the circuit court may have ap-
plied the "substantial evidence" standard. Id. at 1927, n.7. A court using the latter standard 
does not grant as much deference to an agency as when the "arbitrary and capricious" stand-
ard is used, but requires that the agency decision be supported by a substantial factual basis. 
274. 103 S. Ct. at 1928. 
275. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. V 1981). 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Of the range of rates that FERC could have chosen, it picked those rates most advan-
tageous to qualifying facilities. See the discussion of the avoided-cost rule, supra text and 
notes at notes 124-36. 
279. 103 S. Ct at 1928. 
280. Id. at 1929. 
281. Id., quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 12,222 (1980). 
282. 103 S. Ct. at 1929. 
283. Id. at 1928, quoting Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 
360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959). 
284. 103 S. Ct. at 1930. 
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qualifying facilities . . .. No purchase or sale can be completed 
without an interconnection between the buyer and seller."285 While 
American Electric Power Company had argued that PURP A section 
210(e)286 requires a case-by-case analysis by FERC as to whether an 
interconnection would be required, the Supreme Court rejected that 
interpretation.287 Such a requirement, the Court stated, "would 
seriously impede the very development of cogeneration and small 
power production that Congress sought to facilitate."288 The Court 
also found that the interconnection rule does not relieve qualifying 
facilities of any requirements imposed by sections 210289 and 212290 
of the Federal Power Act. Rather, the FERC rule merely permits 
qualifying facilities to force utilities to make interconnections.291 
Thus, FERC's interpretation of the PURPA interconnection provi-
sion was, in the Court's opinion, a reasonable interpretation.292 
In the Mississippi and American Electric decisions, the PURPA 
provisions and the FERC regulations under PURP A have been up-
held. PURPA does not, however, have the wholehearted support of 
the utilities or of state public utility commissions.293 Thus, even the 
Supreme Court decision in American Electric may not end the litiga-
tion over the validity of the PURP A provisions and the FERC regu-
lations. The structure of a utility is closely tied to the regulation of 
that utility, and the enactment of PURPA had a significant effect 
upon utility regulation.294 Even though the constitutionality of 
PURP A has been upheld, and the FERC regulations remain intact, 
utilities may still continue to resist buying power from qualifying 
facilities, as required by PURP A. Since authority has been delegated 
to the state public utility commission to implement PURP A, those 
commissions must force utilities to comply with PURP A. Even 
285. Id. at 1930-31. 
286. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (Supp. V 1981). 
287. 103 S. Ct. at 1931. The circuit court had agreed with the respondents, and had held that 
an evidentiary hearing was required by PURP A for each proposed interconnection. 675 F .2d 
at 1240-41. 
288. 103 S. Ct. at 1931. 
289. 16 U.S.C. § 824i (Supp. V 1981). 
290. Id. § 824k. 
291. 103 S. Ct at 1932. 
292. Id. at 1933. 
293. Jones, supra note 168, at 336. 
294. Even though public utility commissions had only to consider the FERC regulations, 
PURP A did impose additional burdens upon the regulators. Many public utility commissions 
viewed PURP A as encroaching upon traditional state prerogatives and stretching already 
strained agency resources even further. Jones, supra note 168, at 336. 
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though the constitutional hurdles have been cleared, PURP A must 
still face challenges of implementation on a more practical level. The 
changes brought by PURP A may vary from state to state, but cer-
tain difficulties will be encountered in most states. These difficulties 
stem from the economic and political factors surrounding utility 
regulation. 
V. THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF UTILITY REGULATION 
The structure of public utilities is different from most other busi-
nesses and corporations.296 Perhaps most significantly, public utili-
ties are heavily regulated by governmental agencies. In exchange for 
allowing a public utility to have a monopoly on the service it provides 
within a certain geographical area, state and federal governments 
impose extensive controls and regulations on the activities of the 
utility.296 In general, regulation of a utility focuses on requiring a 
particular level and quality of service at a cost which is determined 
by the regulator. 
The regulation of public electric utilities has traditionally been 
vested in a state agency297 which is given its powers by state legisla-
tion. The state agency, typically called a public utility commission, is 
charged with overseeing the function of utilities within its jurisdic-
tion. Its work generally involves a large amount of contact with the 
utility on a regular basis298 so the public utility commission can effec-
tively monitor the utility under the state laws. The unique aspects of 
a utility - particularly the utility/regulatory agency relationship -
must be examined to understand and evaluate the PURP A and 
FERC provisions. 
State public utility commissions typically regulate a range of public 
utilities, including those involved with public transportation, elec-
tricity and gas transmission and sales, water supply, and telephones. 
A state public utility commission is established by state legislation,299 
or in the case of a few states,300 by the state constitution. The en-
abling legislation outlines the powers and authority of the public 
295. For a good discussion of utility structure, see generally P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 
15-27. 
296. See generally P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 16-26. The extent and nature of controls 
imposed upon utilities is discussed infra text at notes 299-322. 
297. See S. BREYER, supra note 18, at 9l. 
298. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 62. 
299. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 1 (West 1981): "There shall be a department 
of public utilities, in this chapter called the department. It shall have an official seal, which 
shall be judicially noticed." 
300. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. XII, S§ 1-9. 
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utility commission and grants the public utility commission jurisdic-
tion over the entry of utilities into the field,301 discontinuance of 
service by the utility,302 rate changes for utility services,303 and other 
points of substantive law arising in the course of proceedings before 
the public utility commission.304 The public utility commission may 
be required to adjudicate matters arising between a utility and its 
constituents, the general public. 305 State enabling legislation typical-
ly gives the public utility commission power to enforce its regulations 
in court,306 and establishes the matters to be considered regarding 
public utility commission orders in a subsequent court hearing.307 It 
is important to note that state legislation, while giving the public 
utility commission jurisdiction over certain utility functions, does not 
usually enumerate specific powers or require specific actions on the 
part of the public utility commission. Instead, enabling legislation is 
usually couched in general terms,308 and the public utility commis-
sion must fill in the gaps with its own procedures and regulations. 
301. See, e.g., the California statute, which states in part: 
No railroad corporation whose railroad is operated primarily by electric energy, 
street railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telegraph cor-
poration, telephone corporation, water corporation, or sewer system corporation 
shall begin the construction of a street railroad, or of a line, plant, or system, or of any 
extension thereof, without having first obtained from the commission a certificate 
that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require 
such construction. 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10901 (West Supp. 1983). 
302. See, e.g., the Massachusetts statute, which states in part: 
Upon request of the mayor of a city or the selectman of a town, or of a member of the 
general court or of twenty customers of the company affected, a public hearing 
ordered by the department, to be held in connection with any change in rates or re-
duction in or discontinuance of service, shall be held in the city or town or area where-
in the company affected does business or in which any decision of the commission 
would apply. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 4A (We'st 1981). 
303. Id. 
304. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 5 (West 1981). One part of § 5 states: "When 
so requested by any party interested, the commission shall rule upon any question of substan-
tive law properly arising in the course of any proceeding before the commission or any member 
or members thereof .... " 
305. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 4A (West 1981). 
306. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 5 (West 1981). A portion of § 5 states: "Any 
decision, order or ruling of the commission shall be effective and may be enforced according to 
its terms and the operation or enforcement thereof shall not be suspended or stayed by the en-
try of an appeal therefrom." 
307. Id. § 5: "No evidence beyond that contained in the record [of the public utility commis-
sion hearing) shall be introduced before the court except that [the court may order additional 
evidence in cases involving confiscation or constitutional rights)." 
308. For example, see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 1975), which provides: "The com-
mission may supervise and regulate every public utility in the State and may do all things, 
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Most states have an administrative procedure act309 which outlines 
the forms and procedures that a public utility commission, as a state 
agency, must follow in holding hearings or adjudicating disputes,310 
or in conducting any task authorized or required by the state en-
abling legislation.311 A state public utility commission is granted the 
authority312 - and in some situations is required313 - to issue 
regulations respecting certain standards under its jurisdiction. 
These regulations may specify the method of rate calculations to be 
used by the public utility commission314 or the amount and content of 
information to be provided to the public utility commission by the 
utility.316 The general scope of regulation of a utility by a public utili-
ty commission usually includes the following aspects:316 
(1) The public utility commission may require the utility to secure 
permission to enter the market;317 
(2) The public utility commission may set up exclusive franchises 
within a specified geographic area, creating a monopoiy;318 
whether specifically designated in this part or in addition thereto, which are necessary and 
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction." 
309. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A (West 1979 & Supp. 1983). The federal 
government has a similar act, covering federal administrative and regulatory agencies, found 
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. 
310. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §§ 2-3A (West 1979). For example, the public 
utility commission may be required to publish written notice of a hearing to all affected par-
ties, allow testimony by those interested parties, and require certain parties to make informa-
tion available to other parties. [d. § 3A. 
311. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1(1) (West 1979) (very broad definition of 
"adjudicatory proceeding", so as to apply to most agency actions). 
312. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 17 (West Supp. 1982) (granting the commis-
sion authority to calculate and make assessments against public utilities). 
313. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 5B (West Supp. 1982), which provides: "The 
department shall issue, following public hearings in accordance with chapter thirty A [ad-
ministrative practice act], rules and regulations for the enforcement of section thirty-three A 
of chapter one hundred sixty-four [respecting promotional and political advertising by 
utilities]. " 
314. See, e.g., MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 220 § 8.04 (1981). (Calculation of Energy Rates for the 
Sale of Electricity by Qualifying Facilities to Utilities). 
315. See, e.g., MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 220 § 1.11(7) (1981) (requiring utilities to file eviden-
tiary documents in support of arguments). 
316. D. ZILLMAN, supra note 24, at 135-36. 
317. See supra note 301 for the California statute requiring utilities to secure permission to 
enter the field. 
318. See, e.g., the California statute, which provides in part: 
If any public utility, in constructing or extending its line, plant, or system, interferes 
or is about to interfere with the operation of the line, plant, or system of any other 
public utility or of the water system of a public agency, already constructed, the com-
mission, on complaint of the public utility or public agency claiming to be injuriously 
affected, may, after hearing, make such order or prescribe such terms and conditions 
for the location of the lines, plants, or systems affected as to it may seem just and 
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(3) The public utility commission may require the utility to main-
tain a certain level or standard of service, and to offer that service to 
all consumers within the franchise area in a non-discriminatory 
fashion;319 
(4) The public utility commission may allow the utility to charge 
only "just and reasonable" rates;320 
(5) The public utility commission may regulate financial aspects of 
the utility, such as the issuance of bonds;321 and 
(6) The public utility commission may require the utility to seek 
permission to discontinue any services.322 
The need for regulation of public utilities stems primarily from the 
monopolistic nature of utilities.323 That monopolistic nature is, in 
turn, founded upon both economic characteristics unique to the utili-
ty industry324 and the nature of the service provided, i.e., to serve a 
basic societal need that does not vary significantly with the cost of 
the product.325 In order to regulate the rates charged to the public, 
the state public utility commission must analyze the costs of opera-
tion of each utility in its jurisdiction based on the data provided to the 
reasonable. 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1001 (West Supp. 1983). 
319. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 93 (West 1976) (regarding orders by the 
commission to the utility requiring the utility to reduce the rates for service or change the 
quality of the service offered). 
320. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West Supp. 1983), which provides in part: "All 
charges demanded or received by any public utility, or by any two or more public utilities, for 
any product or commodity furnished or any services rendered shall be just and reason-
able .... " Control over utility rates is usually one of the more visible aspects of public utility 
commission regulation, due to the direct effect of rate changes on the general public. 
321. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 13A (West Supp. 1983) (setting standards 
for the issuance of bonds by a utility, relative to the utility's current capital stock). 
322. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 21 (West 1976) (requiring a utility to seek 
authorization to transfer its franchise or alter its works). 
323. See generally P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 15-19. 
324. P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 16-26. As compared to general business and manufac-
turing entities, utilities have a very high fixed capital investment in relation to gross revenues. 
This leads to significantly higher taxes in relation to gross revenues than most businesses in 
other industries. [d. Furthermore, utilities have often been singled out for additional taxation. 
[d. at 386. For instance, in the Energy Tax Act of 1978, utilities were specifically made ineligi-
ble for energy tax credits, even though they could have been considered as a prime source for 
developing energy alternatives. I.R.C. § 48(lX3)(B) (Supp. v 1981). See Friedmann and Mayer, 
Energy Tax Credits in the EnerflY Tax Act of 1978 and the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act 
of 1980, 17 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 484-85 (1980). 
325. P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 19-20. The majority of electric consumers have no ac-
cess to alternative sources of electric power. While boosting electric rates may result in some 
decrease in use, such decrease is usually not significant, if present at all; i.e., there is high price 
elasticity of basic utility services. 
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public utility commission by the utility. 326 The public utility commis-
sion then establishes a rate that allows the utility a fair rate of 
return.327 
In carrying out their regulatory functions, state public utility com-
missions generally have two types of tasks: (a) policy-setting tasks, 
which require the public utility commission to make a specific deci-
sion on a specific issue; and (b) apprajsal and coordinating tasks, such 
as processing a rate request, that are of a more bureaucratic 
nature.328 Public utility commissions also have to respond to external 
pressures from state administrators and legislators, from their 
"clients," the public-at-large, and from special-interest groupS.329 
Thus, each public utility commission is a combination of bureaucratic 
and political entities which do not necessarily have the same goalS.330 
One result of this situation is that the management of a public utility 
commission may want to change the public utility commission pro-
cedures in response to outside pressure, whereas the public utility 
commission staff, who may be insulated from external or political 
pressures, may want to maintain existing procedures in order to 
minimize strain or additional work. 
Finally, state public utility commissions are generally greatly 
understaffed given the amount of information they are required to 
process.331 Because of insufficient resources, public utility commis-
sions must often look for external support, although this may be at 
326. See generally id. at 44-56. The cost of service includes operating expenses, deprecia-
tion eJqJenses, taxes, and gross valuation of capital minus accrued depreciation. A primary 
concern of the public utility commission is that improper expenses are not included, and that 
includible expenses are "reasonable and necessary." Id. 
327. Id. at 118-33. A reasonable rate of return has been held as that rate "generally being 
made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other 
business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties," Blue-
field Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 
U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923), and "sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the 
enterprise," FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). While the rate may not 
be so low as to be confiscatory, 262 U.S. at 683, the public utility commission does not have to 
protect the utility from "business hazards", Public Service Commission of Montana v. Great 
Northern Utilities Co., 289 U.S. 130, 135 (1932), or "economic forces", Market Street Railway 
Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945). 
328. D. ANDERSON, supra note at 27, at 18-19. 
329. Id. at 2. 
330. Id. For example, public utility commissioners, in response to political pressure, may 
want to implement a new procedure for dealing with utilities. The bureaucratic arm of the 
agency, however, may be more interested in maintaining the status quo in order to avoid 
disrupting relations with the utilities, thereby adding to tJ:!.e agency's workload. 
331. Id. at 9. As business strategy is the "application of massive resources to limited objec-
tives", regulatory agency strategy is the "application of limited resources to massive objec-
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the expense of political clout.332 In return for aid in the form of infor-
mation or political support, the agency may have to adopt the posi-
tions of the special interest group providing that support; in order to 
continue receiving any external support, the agency, in its decisions, 
will need to recognize the. viewpoints and positions of its "sup-
porters. "333 
State public utility commissions, in deriving their power from state 
governments, are often subject to the political vagaries of a state 
legislature or administration, particularly with regard to funding or 
the appointment of head administrators.334 Because of these political 
influences, and because the public utility commissions generally are 
not given specific powers by the legislature,335 enforcement of their 
provisions on a day-to-day basis may be very difficult in practice. 
Varying political control from a legislature,336 combined with fund-
ing levels which are often inadequate, engender many uncertainties 
at a public utility commission.337 In addition, a public utility commis-
sion must often review extensive and complex data provided by the 
utilities.338 
The roles of public utility commission and utility are usually oppos-
ing, and utilities are likely to prod at the weaknesses of a public utili-
ty commission by exploiting the commission's lack of political power, 
or by flooding the commission with unnecessary information. 339 
Because of these factors, regulation of the utility industry by state 
public utility commissions has tended to occur from a defensive 
posture aimed at preventing abuses rather than promoting the goals 
of utility regulation.340 Regulation from this stance means that 
tives". Bower, Effective Public Management, 55 HARV. Bus. REV. 131 (1977), quoted in ANDER· 
SON, supra note 27, at 9. 
332. D. ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 10-14. External support would generally come from 
special-interest groups, such as environmental concern organizations, or consumer-interest 
foundations. Support could also come from the utility industry itself. "Support" from a utility 
or other organization usually means providing information to the public utility commission or 
generating support for difficult issues. Special-interest groups often provide a form of support 
to a public utility commission by adopting a stance directly opposite that taken by a utility on a 
particular issue. This type of situation allows the public utility commission to take the middle 
ground, which is likely to be a stronger position politically. [d. 
333. [d. 
334. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 8-9. 
335. See supra text and notes at note 308. 
336. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 10-12. 
337. See infra text and notes at notes 329-42. 
338. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 64-68. 
339. [d. at 15-18. 
340. [d. at 61. Public utility commissions are frequently so overburdened with work that all 
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utilities have been making major decisions as long as the public utili-
ty commission has considered those decisions to be "just and 
reasonable. "841 
The combination of political uncertainty, the conflicting nature of 
public utility commission tasks, and the lack of resources 
demonstrate the need for strong and specific legislative backing for 
a public utility commission, to enable it to assert itself and effectively 
carry out its policies. Lacking such support, the public utility com-
mission is more likely to be heavily influenced by the actions of the 
utilities over whom it theoretically has control. 842 Therefore, im-
plementation of PURP A may vary greatly with the amount of con-
trol that each public utility commission can exert. State legislation 
may establish the amount of influence exerted by the public utility 
commission, and therefore may affect the commission's ability to 
gain the utilities' compliance with PURP A. Thus, state legislative 
support of agency authority may be crucial in the encouragement of 
cogeneration and small power production. Since PURP A requires 
active cooperation from the states to implement its programs, the 
following section examines the existing state regulatory schemes 
concerning cogeneration and small power production. 
VI. STATE LEGISLATION CONCERNING COGENERATION 
AND SMALL POWER PRODUCTION OF ELECTRICITY 
A number of states have enacted legislation concerning cogenera-
tion and small power production.848 These statutes must be assessed 
in light of PURP A, as they may advance or retard the achievement 
of its goals. Most of this legislation has been directed toward the 
state public utility commission, and has authorized the commission to 
take action encouraging or requiring utilities to purchase power 
from cogenerators or small power producers. Legislation at the state 
level may be very important in order to effectuate the development 
of efficient electric power generation. 
of their time is spent reacting to requests, demands, and actions of others, and little time is 
spent actively promoting state or federal interests. Id. 
341. [d. The "just and reasonable" standard for allowable return for utilities was estab-
lished in Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602. 
342. D. ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 10-14. A state legislature could provide more support 
by: allowing greater funding of public utility commission activities; by authorizing or requir-
ing, in a more specific manner, the public utility commission to take certain activities in 
regulating utilities; or by structuring laws affecting utilities so as to give the public utility com-
mission more leverage in enforcement. Id. 
343. The states are listed supra note 194. 
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A. Background 
Many utilities have been slow to comply with PURP A and the 
FERC regulations promulgated thereunder.344 Reasons given for 
this hesitation include: (1) government's lack of power to impose 
federal standards in PURP A upon state regulatory agencies;345 (2) 
FERC's standard that rates payable to qualifying facilities be equal 
to full avoided cost reaches beyond the authority given FERC;346 (3) 
FERC's requirement that any utility interconnect with any qualify-
ing facility is in violation of the PURP A provisions for insuring safe-
ty and reliability;347 and (4) the FERC's provisions, while complying 
with the PURP A goal of encouraging cogeneration and small power 
production, do not adequately consider the "public interest" as man-
dated by PURP A. 348 
As discussed earlier, 349 these arguments were largely raised in the 
Mississippi and American Electric cases. The imposition of federal 
standards upon the states by PURP A was upheld in Mississippi, and 
the FERC regulations were ultimately upheld in American Electric. 
There has been much delay, however, in establishing the validity of 
the regulatory scheme under PURP A, and the development of small 
power production facilities has not regained its momentum.350 
Small power producers and cogenerators have had to depend on 
state public utility commissions to apply pressure to the utilities to 
interconnect with and purchase power from those producers and 
cogenerators.351 The state public utility commissions, in turn, have 
344. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, Oct. 7, 1982. 
345. See supra discussion of FERC v. Mississippi, at notes 212-42. 
346. See supra discussion of American Electric, at notes 244-92. 
347. Id. 
348. Id. 
349. See supra text and notes at notes 212-92. 
350. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, August 
24, 1983. 
35l. Telephone interview with Doug Short, staff economist, Massachusetts Department of 
Public Utilities, October 25, 1982. Most of the prospective cogeneration or small production 
facilities require some sort of financing, or at least represent a major investment even for in-
dustries that do not need to seek external financing. The procurement of financing will in turn 
depend almost entirely on the economics of the situation; i.e., how much of a return can be ex-
pected on the investment, and how quickly can the facility become self-supporting. Once the 
projected development, capital, and operating costs have been established, the answer to those 
questions will depend primarily on the rate to be paid by the utility to the qualifying facility for 
power. Of equal import to the expected rate, in the eyes of the lenders, is the stability of that 
rate. Toward that end, lenders will require long-term contracts with a guaranteed rate before 
lending money for the project. See Greenman, Interface Between Developers of Small Hydro 
Projects and Utilities, 5 VT. L. REV. 313, 326 (1980). In return for long-term contracts, many 
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encountered great difficulty in obtaining the utilities' compliance 
with PURPA.352 The public utility commissions' stance in the face of 
attacks on PURP A has generally been very tentative because of: (1) 
the political nature of public utility commissions and their need for 
support in regulating utilities;353 (2) the attacks on the validity of 
public utility commission authority derived from the federal govern-
ment;354 and (3) the disruption and delay due to the litigation sur-
rounding American Electric,355 in implementing the FERC provi-
sions, which had authorized the state public utility commissions to re-
quire interconnections between utilities and qualifying facilities and 
to establish rates for electric power produced by qualifying facilities. 
Under the provisions of PURPA, electric utilities may be required 
to engage in power transactions with other producers of power. 
From the utilities' perspective, these transactions will result at best 
in a smaller increase in future expansion than expected, or at worst 
in the emergence of a competing unregulated industry, bringing to 
the utilities a loss of business and revenue.356 PURP A contains no 
practical incentives for utilities and is, in fact, contrary to their in-
terests. These factors underscore the need for strong state support 
of cogeneration and small power production. 
Regardless of the delay and uncertainty resulting from the 
PURP A litigation, the various problems that have arisen under 
PURP A involve issues that can be resolved at the state level. 
Because the states are the primary regulators of utilities,357 and 
because the authority given to a state public utility commission to act 
can come most clearly from the state itself,358 state legislation seems 
to be an ideal means for finding a solution to the gaps, ambiguities, 
and disagreements that have arisen pursuant to the enactment of 
PURP A. Some states have taken various constructive measures in 
this direction that are worth noting. 
utilities will demand price concessions, with the eventual rate below that set by the state public 
utility commission. [d. at 326-27. 
352. Jones, supra note 168, at 336. 
353. See supra text and notes at notes 336-41. 
354. See supra text and notes at notes 212-42. 
355. See supra text and notes at notes 244-92. 
356. See generally Jones, supra note 168, at 336-37. 
357. S. BREYER, supra note 18, at 91. 
358. See supra the discussion of the federalism issue, and the imposition of federal regula-
tions on state regulatory agencies, in the FERC v. Mississippi analysis, at notes 212-42. 
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B. State Legislation After PURP A 
The overall scheme of PURP A allows the states to take independ-
ent action in order to achieve the goals of the statute.359 States may 
choose from a number of approaches to resolve the federal/state con-
flicts,360 the perceived lack of power or authority of public utility 
commissions under PURP A, 361 and the unwillingness of utilities to 
comply with the provisions of PURP A requiring interconnection 
with and purchase of power produced by qualifying facilities. 362 
Through legislation, states could grant the public utility commission 
specific authority to implement PURP A; they could enact a mini-
PURP A, encompassing the same interconnection, exemption, and 
rate standards as the federal legislation; finally, states might offer 
incentives to utilities to participate in the development of cogenera-
tion and small power production. There are a small number of states 
that have used these methods. 
1. Increasing Public Utility Commission Authority 
One approach could be to resolve the federal/state tension incurred 
by imposing federal provisions on state agencies. States could 
neutralize this conflict by enacting legislation specifically granting 
the state public utility commission the authority to implement the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission provisions. A state statute 
granting this authority removes the argument that the federal 
government cannot impose its procedures and mandates upon state 
agencies.363 Two states have taken this step and have authorized 
their respective public utility commissions to apply the PURP A pro-
visions in the state.364 Giving the state public utility commission the 
authority to implement the PURP A provisions and FERC regula-
tions, however, does not resolve the problem presented by American 
Electric. Additionally, this approach may not provide sufficient sup-
359. See supra notes 147 and 194. 
360. The federal/state conflicts were the focus of the Mississippi case, discussed supra text 
at notes 205-43. 
361. See supra text at notes 351-53. 
362. See supra the discussion of American Electric, at notes 244-92. 
363. This argument was raised by the State of Mississippi in FERC v. Mississippi. See supra 
text and notes at notes 205-43. 
364. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.05(9) (West Supp. 1983); TEXAS CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. 
§ 1446c-16A (Vernon Supp. 1983). For example, TEXAS CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 1446c-
16A states: "The commission shall make and enforce rules reasonably required to implement 
the rules and regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission pertaining to the pro-
duction of electric energy by qualifying cogenerators and qualifying small power producers." 
192 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:149 
port for a utility commission which does not have the resources to en-
force federal policies.365 
2. State Mini-PURPA's 
The second approach would be for the state to authorize the state 
public utility commission to require interconnection, or to set rates 
for power produced by qualifying facilities. Authorization would thus 
be vested in the state public utility commission by a mini-PURPA,366 
and would not be dependent on the status of the federal regulations. 
Under the FERC regulations, the states are not prohibited from tak-
ing this approach.367 The specific grant of authority from a state 
legislature to a state public utility commission further enhances the 
commission's power to enforce compliance by the utilities with 
PURP A, as such authority avoids the question of whether the state 
commission can be empowered by federal legislation. 368 
Currently, eleven states369 have enacted statutes with interconnec-
tion requirements or rate-setting standards. Tw0370 of the eleven 
states, in specifically granting authority to their public utility com-
missions to set rates for qualifying facility power, do not enumerate 
standards for setting those rates. The other nine states371 specify 
standards for the public utility commissions to consider in setting the 
rates. These standards range from the New York standard of "just 
and economically reasonable to the rate-payers"372 to the North 
365. See the discussion of state agency effectiveness in relation to political and economic 
support, supra text and notes at notes 328-42. 
366. A grant of authority to the state public utility commission by the state legislature 
would not be questioned because the state legislature can authorize the public utility commis-
sion to act as the state desires. See supra text and notes at notes 299-308. 
367. FERC indicated that the regulations under PURPA were to act as minimum stand-
ards, and the states could place greater requirements upon utilities to encourage cogeneration 
and small power production. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,221 (1980). 
368. See supra text at notes 205-43 for a discussion of FERC v. Mississippi. 
369. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2801 (West Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-243a (West 
Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2.4-4 (Burns 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-1,184 (1980); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 2325 (West Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216B.164 (West Supp. 
1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-603 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 362-A § 3 (Supp. 1981); 
N.Y. PUB. SERVo LAW § 66-c (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-156 (1982); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 758.510 (1981). 
370. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 362-A § 4 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-1, 184 (1980). 
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 362-A § 4 (Supp. 1981): "Public utilities purchasing elec-
trical energy in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall pay a price per kilowatt 
hour to be set from time to time, by the public utilities commission." 
371. The statutes are listed supra note 369. All statutes except those from New Hampshire 
and Kansas specify rate-setting standards. 
372. The New York statute provides in part: 
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Carolina requirement373 that the public utility commission set the 
rates at full avoided energy and capacity costS.374 The establishment 
of rate-setting standards by a state legislature makes the authority 
of the state public utility commission for setting qualifying facility 
rates and requiring interconnections independent of the federal 
regulations. State legislation also gives additional backing to the 
public utility commission which may reduce the strains on the public 
utility commission staff.375 Furthermore, legislative specification of 
rate standards allows a utility commission to focus its efforts on 
issues other than establishing such standards. 376 
A grant of greater or more specific authority to a public utility 
commission is a means of enforcing compliance with the 
commission's regulations. Utilities, however, have resisted forced 
participation in the development of alternative energy sources, par-
ticularly when they have not been assured of any ultimate gain from 
the encouragement of qualifying facility power production.377 Offer-
ing incentives to electric utilities for their participation in qualifying 
facility power production, the third approach considered, may 
therefore be very desirable in order to smooth implementation of the 
FERC provisions. 
[T]he commission shall require any electric corporation or steam corporation (a) to 
enter into long-term contracts to purchase or wheel electricity ... from any alternate 
energy production facility, small hydro, or cogeneration facility under such terms as 
the commission shall find just and economically reasonable to the corporation's rate-
payers, nondiscriminatory to cogenerators, small hydro producers, and alternate 
energy producers .... 
N.Y. PUB. SERVo LAW § 66-c (McKinney Supp. 1983). 
373. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-156(bX2) (1982). 
374. This section provides in part: 
[d. 
The rates paid by a utility to a small power producer shall not exceed, over the term 
of the purchase power contract, the incremental cost to the electric utility of the elec-
tric energy which, but for the purchase from a small power producer, the utility 
would generate or purchase from another source. A determination of the avoided 
energy costs to the utility shall include a consideration of the following factors over 
the term of the power contracts: the expected costs of the additional or existing 
generating capacity which could be displaced .... 
375. See supra text and notes at notes 334-42 for a discussion on the effect of stronger 
legislative and political support upon public utility commission strength. 
376. For instance, if the state statute provides a standard for rate-setting for the state 
public utility commission to implement, then the public utility commission must concern itself 
with implementation. If no standard is expressed by the state, however, the public utility com-
mission must hold hearings according to a state administrative procedure act to determine the 
appropriate standards, before it can implement them. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 10. 
377. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, February 15, 
1983. 
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3. Statutory Incentives for Utilities 
Offering incentives to utilities is a different approach from increas-
ing public utility commission authority. Whereas increasing public 
utility commission authority is a means of enforcing compliance with 
PURP A, offering incentives to utilities is more a means of coaxing 
compliance. This third approach has been taken by two states, Mon-
tana378 and New York,379 which have enacted legislation allowing 
utility participation in small power production development.38o The 
Montana and New York requirements are less restrictive than those 
of the FERC. The FERC regulations restrict utility ownership of a 
qualifying facility to less than fifty percent equity interest.381 Under 
both the Montana and New York statutes, utilities may own more 
than fIfty percent equity interest in a qualifying facility. The Mon-
tana statute382 pertains only to hydroelectric projects. Under the 
Montana statute, the state public utility commission is given the 
authority to determine which locations are to be used,383 to accept 
applications for leasing, 384 to determine the lessee and conditions 
for operation,385 and to retain all licenses and permits.386 Even with 
all of these restrictions, utilities may be interested in entering the 
market since the power produced by qualifying facilities is not 
regulated. With all other factors equal, a lesser regulatory burden 
will mean a greater net income. 
The New York law allows utilities to establish wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries for the purpose of owning and operating qualifying 
facilities. 387 The subsidiary is required to conduct its operations com-
pletely separately from the parent company388 and the utility is not 
378. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1-501, 85-1-513 (1981). 
379. N.Y. PUB. SERVo LAW § 66-c(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983). 
380. The New York statute provides in part: 
Id. 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, any gas, electric, or steam corporation 
shall . . . be authorized to establish . .. a subsidiary corporation, which corporation 
shall have as its sole purpose the ownership and/or operation, in whole or in part, of 
one or more cogeneration, small hydro or alternate energy production facilities. 
381. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206(b) (1982). Even though utilities may still become involved in quali-
fying facilities subject to the 50% limit, joint ownership of cogeneration or small power produc-
tion facilities is not likely. RPA COGENERATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.17. 
382. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1-501, 81-1-513 (1981). 
383. Id. § 85-1-502. 
384. Id. S 85-1-503. 
385. Id. SS 85-1-504, 85-1-505. 
386. Id. S 85-1-506. 
387. N.Y. PuB. SERVo LAW SS 66-c(2), 66-c(3) (McKinney Supp. 1983). See supra note 380. 
388. Id. S 66-c(3)(a)(2). 
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allowed to include the operation and assets of the subsidiary in its 
rate base.389 Whether or not the utility may include the assets of a 
subsidiary cogenerator or small power production facility in its rate 
base, ownership of such a facility could mean financial benefit for the 
utility. Qualifying facilities are exempted from regulation, so some of 
the management burden is reduced. Furthermore, a utility can 
negotiate with its subsidiary to pay a lower rate than the rate that a 
qualifying facility owned by another party might accept.390 Of 
course, this discussion assumes that cogeneration and small power 
production of electricity can be profitable. Eliminating ownership re-
quirements for qualifying facilities would allow interested utilities to 
venture into this area of electric power generation. 
Despite the restrictions that are still placed upon the utilities, the 
New York and Montana statutes have taken a step toward encourag-
ing the active participation of electric utilities in the development of 
cogeneration and small power production.391 This step and others 
may be necessary in order for cogeneration and small power produc-
tion to gain a strong foothold. 392 Legislative measures which provide 
incentives for utility participation in cogeneration and small power 
development may spur the development of new generation capacity 
using renewable resources. The following section discusses various 
approaches in detail. 
C. Legislative Proposals 
The provisions of PURPA, and of most state mini-PURPA's subse-
quently enacted, focus on incentives to industrial cogenerators and 
389. [d. § 66-c(3Xc). 
Inclusion of the assets and expenses of a facility in the utilities' rate base would increase the 
rate base, and ultimately increase the rates allowed because a utility is typically allowed to 
earn a regulated rate-of-return which is calculated as a percentage of its rate base. See general-
ly P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 56-58; A. KAHN, supra note 11, at 35-41. It is not clear from 
the Montana statute whether involvement in this type of project by a utility would affect the 
utility's rate base. 
390. The FERC regulations do not preclude utilities and qualifying facilities from negotiat-
ing their own agreement, 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(bXl) (1982). In actual practice, this type of nego-
tiation is the most commonly used means for reaching agreement, since qualifying facilities do 
not want the delay and expense of going through the public utility commission in order to 
reach an agreement with the utility. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & 
Smick, Boston, February 15, 1983. Telephone interview with Thomas R. Morton, Vice-
President, Windfarms, Ltd., February 27, 1983. 
391. This step has been suggested by writers in the field. See RPA COGENERATION REPORT, 
supra note 5, at 2.17-.18. 
392. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, October 7, 1982. 
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developers of alternate energy sources. Since cogenerators and 
small power producers may not sell their power directly to the 
public,393 cooperation of electric utilities is a necessary adjunct to 
cogeneration and small power development. Many utilities have 
resisted attempts to enlist their support in the development of small 
power facilities. 394 Thus, legislation which provides incentives for 
utilities to aid in developing efficient and alternate-energy-fueled 
electric power generation should be considered. 
Proposed incentives for gaining utility cooperation have included 
changing the ownership requirements for qualifying facilities under 
PURP A, allowing electric utilities an increase in their rate-of-return 
based on electric power purchased from qualifying facilities, extend-
ing the energy tax credit to utilities, or allowing utilities other tax 
benefits currently accorded commercial and industrial corporations. 
1. Less Restrictive Ownership Requirements 
The first proposed incentive involves changing the ownership re-
quirements for qualification under PURP A. 395 The standard as pro-
mulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission restricts 
utility ownership of a cogeneration or small power production facili-
ty to less than fifty percent in order for the facility to qualify for ex-
emption from regulation or for the interconnection and rate-setting 
standards under PURP A. 396 This approach has been adopted by 
Montana and New York.397 Several reasons have been advanced for 
allowing utilities to participate in cogeneration and small power pro-
duction: (a) utilities are more familiar with the operation of 
generating plants; (b) utilities have extensive experience in dealing 
with federal and state legislation concerning energy development, 
such as PURP A, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, and 
the National Gas Policy Act; (c) utilities can generally purchase fuels 
at lower costs than industrial cogenerators because they buy in 
larger quantities; and (d) utilities often have a lower return on invest-
ment than most industrial corporations, and therefore can more easi-
393. PURPA § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
394. Jones, supra note 168, at 336. 
395. Proposals to allow utilities to own greater than 50% equity interest in a qualifying 
facility have been proposed by several writers. See, e.g., RPA COGENERATION REPORT, supra 
note 5, at 2.17. 
396. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206(b) (1982). 
397. See supra text and notes at notes 378-89 for discussion of the New York and Montana 
statutes. 
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ly make money from a cogeneration or small power producing facili-
ty than could a corporation in another industry. 398 
Some proponents of small power facilities have noted drawbacks 
to allowing utility ownership of qualifying facilities. 399 For example, 
utilities might use less stringent ownership criteria to gain control 
over the development of alternative energy power production 
facilities and then limit the amount of small power development.4oo 
Another concern is that utilities might exploit the unregulated 
aspect of qualifying facilities by channelling utility assets into an en-
tity whose rate-of-return would not be regulated.401 
For this proposal, the advantages seem to outweigh the 
drawbacks. One purpose of PURP A was to encourage the produc-
tion of electric power by renewable resources. To the extent that 
utilities would develop small power production facilities they would 
be furthering the aims of PURP A. Even though utilities might 
develop unregulated subsidiaries, the overall size of each facility is 
still subject to limitation in order for the facility to be exempted from 
regulation. 402 Furthermore, under PURPA, a qualifying facility 
must sell to a utility and not to retail customers,403 so that power pro-
duced by any qualifying facility which is sold to a utility will be sub-
ject to rate regulation to the extent that a utility's rates are always 
subject to regulation by a state public utility commission. On balance, 
the public benefits from the decreased dependence on fossil fuels 
seem to outweigh any harm that might result from the ownership of 
qualifying facilities by utilities. 
2. Increased Rate-of-Return 
A second approach would allow utilities an increased rate-of-
return for the amount of electric power purchased by the utility from 
a qualifying facility.404 The allowance of an increased rate-of-return 
398. RPA COGENERATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.17-2.18. 
399. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, October 7, 1982. 
400. Id. Proponents of alternate energy technology have expressed concern over potential 
control of such technology by utilities. This concern is based on the belief that utilities might 
use their position as a major supplier of power to buy up the rights to alternate energy 
technology and then stifle its use, either purposefully or only as a matter of promoting other 
technologies. See generally Lawrence and Minan, The Competitive Aspects of Utility Par-
ticipation in Solar Development, 11 LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 175,204-14 (1980). 
401. Interview with Jeffrey Bernstein, Esq., Bernstein & Smick, Boston, October 7, 1982. 
402. PURPA § 210(e), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (Supp. V 1981). 
403. Id. § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
404. Although this approach has been suggested, no state has enacted legislation allowing 
such an increased rate-of-return. 
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would mean that a utility could make more money on power pur-
chased from a cogenerator or small power producer than on power 
purchased from another utility.405 This incentive would mean that a 
utility which had to purchase power would be more likely to do so 
from a qualifying facility, and would be more likely to enter into a 
long term arrangement with a qualifying facility for the purehase of 
power.406 
There are several drawbacks to allowing an increased rate-of-
return based on power purchased from a qualifying facility. First, 
any utility currently possessing sufficient or excess capacity would 
have no incentive to enter into an agreement with a qualifying facili-
ty unless the rate payable to the qualifying facility would be approx-
imately equal to the utility's own cost of producing electricity,,407 Sec-
ond, this incentive could result in higher overall costs to the electric 
consumers because of the increased rate-of-return allowed the utili-
ty.408 Finally, it can be argued that this incentive merely allows a 
utility to gain added, and perhaps unjust, benefit from the purchase 
of electricity from a qualifying facility when the PURP A standards 
have already allowed for sufficient benefit to a utility for such pur-
chases.409 
Allowing the utilities an increased rate-of-return would probably 
cause more controversy than other possible incentives for utilities if 
the general public perceives that higher costs would merely be 
passed on to the consumer. Consequently, this incentive is probably 
not likely to be enacted. Where a utility currently purchases power 
405. See generally P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 116, for a discussion of the rate-of-return 
concept in public utility economics. 
406. It is assumed that the increased rate of return would be sufficiently large to offset any 
price differential between the rate for power paid by a utility to another utility and the rate 
paid to a qualifying facility. Two utilities engaged in an electric power sale will often adopt a 
"split-the-savings" approach for determining the rate payable. Under that approac.h, the pur-
chasing utility pays a rate halfway between its own cost of production and the selling utility's 
cost of generation. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,222 (1982). If the rate for power payable to a qualifying 
facility, as set by a state public utility commission, is significantly greater than the rate deter-
mined by the split-the-savings approach, then the utility may not be willing to purchase power 
from the qualifying facility even with the increased rate of return. 
407. See supra note 406. 
408. The increased rate of return allowed to the utility must come from increased revenues 
for a given rate base. See supra text and notes at notes 325-26. See generally P. GARFIELD, 
supra note 10, at 114-19. 
409. The intent of Congress in passing PURPA § 210 was that the utilities' interests would 
be protected by setting the rate for qualifying facility power at the lower of "just and 
reasonable and in the public interest" or the incremental rate. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra 
note 15, at 7832. The "incremental rate" is discussed supra note 128. 
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from another utility, however, this alternative should be considered 
as a means of decreasing fossil fuel dependence. 
3. Tax Incentives 
A third area of incentives has focused on tax deductions410 or tax 
credits411 for utilities.412 Proposed incentives for utility participation 
in cogeneration and small power production include extending the 
energy tax credit to utilities,413 or allowing utilities a twenty percent 
investment tax credit for investing in more efficient or renewable-
resource powered generation equipment.414 A discussion of tax 
credits or other tax incentives must include consideration of the 
"flow-through" effect of tax savings upon utilities.416 The cost of 
service to the consumer is based upon operating, depreciation, and 
tax expenses, plus a return on capital investment.416 If a utility's tax 
liability is decreased, the cost of service goes down, and the utility's 
revenues likewise decrease.417 Thus, a utility may have little or no in-
centive to employ measures resulting in a tax deduction or credit if 
any tax savings will merely flow through to the consumers.418 
The business energy tax credit presently allows businesses to 
deduct from their tax liability up to fifteen percent of the value of 
410. A tax deduction reduces gross income and therefore reduces the amount of income 
upon which a tax is calculated. 
411. A tax credit is a reduction of the tax liability or the amount of the tax due. The credit 
reduces taxes owed on a dollar-for-dollar basis. 
412. See generally RPA COGENERATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.3-2.17; Friedmann, 
supra note 324, at 484. 
413. See, e.g., RPA COGENERATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.13-.17. Businesses may take 
an energy tax credit for investment in "energy property" (which includes electric power 
generation equipment using cogeneration techniques or renewable resources) of up to 10 per-
cent of the value of the investment. I.R.C. S 48(1) (Supp. IV 1980). However, utilities may not 
make use of this tax credit. Id. S 48(1)(17). 
414. RPA COGENERATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.17. Utilities are presently allowed to 
take a 10% investment tax credit for new capital investments, which would include new 
generating equipment, I.R.C. S 48(a)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980). 
415. A. KAHN, supra note 11, at 33-34; see generally P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 44. 
416. P. GARFIELD, supra note 10, at 44. 
417. See id. 
418. See A. KAHN, supra note 11, at 33-34. A tax deduction may sometimes be merely a tax 
deferral, such as when a company taking accelerated depreciation in the early years of the 
equipment's lifetime must subsequently take a proportionately smaller amount in later years. 
Id. Regulatory commissions are not in agreement whether to pass on the benefits of accel-
erated depreciation to consumers, or to "normalize" the amount of the taxes due, and allow 
the utility an interest-free loan of the money. Id. To the extent that a commission requires the 
utility to pass along any savings from deferred taxes, the utility will recognize no benefit from 
the deduction or credit. Id. 
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energy equipment using renewable resources.419 Public utilities, 
however, are specifically excluded from the use of this credit.420 It 
has been suggest~d that the credit be extended to utilities, since they 
are the entities most capable of collecting energy from alternate 
resources and distributing it to a large number of persons.421 Fur-
thermore, any utility needing to upgrade its capacity would find the 
fifteen percent tax credit a major incentive for developing genera-
tion capacity using renewable resources.422 Some states allow 
businesses an energy tax credit for alternate energy equipment,423 
but utilities are also excluded from some of those state provisions.424 
Modification of normal public utility commission treatment of tax 
savings to utilities may be helpful in encouraging utilities to invest in 
renewable resource energy equipment. Any utility might, however, 
consider the development of a qualifying facility if business energy 
tax credits were applicable to public utilities. To disallow the credit 
for the one industry most likely to develop energy capacity seems to 
be shortsighted. Energy tax credits, whether on a state or federal 
level, should be allowed for utilities, as an alternative means of 
achieving the PURP A goals. 
A proposed incentive similar to the energy tax credit is the invest-
ment tax credit.425 Non-oil or gas-fired cogenerators are presently 
allowed an investment tax credit totalling twenty percent of the 
capital investment.426 A utility investing in the same equipment, 
however, is only allowed a ten percent credit.427 Utilities would seem 
to be a prime target for a tax credit aimed at the development of elec-
tric power generation using renewable fuels. Federal and state tax 
incentives designed to encourage alternate energy development 
could logically be extended to utilities. Furthermore, utilities could 
419. I.R.C. § 48(1)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). 
420. Id. § 48(1)(17). 
421. Friedmann, supra note 324, at 502-03. 
422. The energy tax credit is subtracted directly from tax liability. I.R.C. §§ 38(a), 48(1)(1) 
(Supp. IV 1980). To the extent that this tax credit exceeds any other available investment 
credit, see supra note 414, a utility might be interested in developing generating capacity us-
ing renewable resources. 
423. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 63 § 38H (West Supp. 1983); CAL. REV. & T. CODE 
§ 17226 (West 1983). 
424. For example, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 63 § 38H (West Supp. 1983) applies only to 
"business corporations", which definition does not include public utilities. 
425. See supra note 414. 
426. I.R.C. § 48(1)(14) (Supp. IV 1980). This is the combination of a 10% investment tax 
credit, id. § 48(1) and a 10% energy tax credit, id. § 48(1). 
427. See supra notes 413-14. 
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gain an additional incentive for investing in such tax-saving 
measures if state public utility commissions were to allow those utili-
ties to benefit, at least partially, from any tax savings. 
All of the incentives mentioned above - allowing utilities to own 
qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities, allow-
ing utilities an increased rate-of-return for power purchased from a 
qualifying facility, or allowing utilities to take tax credits for in-
vestments in generating equipment using renewable resources - are 
consistent with the goals of decreased dependence on fossil fuels and 
increased reliance on renewable resources. Although the establish-
ment of such incentives could result in higher costs to the consumer 
for electric power, each of these incentives should be considered both 
by federal and by state governments. Particularly with regard to 
ownership limitations on qualifying facilities and rate-of-return ad-
justments for power produced by renewable resources, the states are 
in a better position to enact such incentives because the states and 
state agencies are most directly concerned with these issues on a 
day-to-day basis.428 Since most of the tax incentives are based on 
federal income taxes, federal legislative changes will have more im-
pact than state proposals. State public utility commissions, however, 
can enhance any tax incentives by allowing utilities to retain tax 
benefits. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Decreased dependence on fossil fuels and increased efficiency in 
the production of electricity - two goals of the National Energy Act 
- are very desirable achievements. The provisions of PURP A at-
tempt to reach those goals by encouraging electric energy genera-
tion that is more efficient than the current industry standard, and by 
encouraging the use of renewable resources for electric energy pro-
duction. These provisions established policies and standards that 
would not have been established so quickly on a state-by-state basis. 
The PURP A provisions and FERC regulations promulgated 
thereunder, however, cannot solve all of the problems that arise in 
mov-ing toward increased energy efficiency and decreased fossil fuel 
dependence. 
PURP A upset the status quo of utility regulation, and opposition 
to the federal policy by utilities has continued. Utilities have chal-
lenged the imposition of federal standards upon state agencies; the 
428. See supra text and notes at notes 49-51. 
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federal regulations for implementing PURP A are not completely 
settled. An important federal policy has become bogged down in the 
practicalities of implementation. In analyzing PURP A and in con-
sidering possible resolution of federal/state conflicts, public utility 
commission authority under federal or state law, or encouragement 
of utility participation in the implementation of PURP A, one factor 
must be remembered at all times: the preponderance of utility 
regulation has been, and continues to be, exercised at the state level. 
Therefore, resolution of those issues should be considered at the 
state level, where authority can clearly be delegated to the state 
agencies which have regular contact with the utility industry. It is 
those state agencies - public utility commissions - which, if given 
enough authority, can most effectively implement the development 
of power by qualifying facilities. In addition, cooperation by electric 
utilities will be more readily gained if the utilities are offered some 
benefits over the long run which are linked to their assistance and 
cooperation in implementing the goals of PURP A. 
